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Abstract: In this dissertation, I examine why authoritarian ruling parties strengthen 
political control and evaluate political consequences of strong ruling party control. I argue 
that authoritarian ruling parties have incentives to enhance local party control over 
legislatures to strengthen personnel control, respond to rising social unrests, and elevate 
political status of congresses. However, authoritarian ruling parties may confront a trade-
off in their attempts to tightly control legislatures. Strong party control impedes bottom-up 
information from legislators and is limited to improve legislative oversights of executive 
power. Moreover, I estimate the political consequences of corruption monitoring 
institutions on the supply of politicians. I demonstrate that corruption monitoring pushes 
capable young elites away from competing government jobs. The effect is driven by two 
possible mechanisms: economic returns and career prospects. It provides evidence on the 
unintended negative effect of corruption monitoring institutions. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
INTRODUCTION 
Political parties are widely adopted in nondemocracies to facilitate power sharing, 
co-opt ruling elites, and enhance elite cohesion (Gandhi 2008; Geddes 1999; Magaloni 
2006; Svolik 2012). In particular, one-party regimes are the most common type of 
authoritarian rule (Magaloni and Kricheli 2010). Regimes with a single or a dominant party 
survive longer and grow faster than other types of authoritarian regimes (Magaloni 2008; 
Wright and EscribàFolch 2012). However, strong ruling parties are scarcer than commonly 
expected. The majority of ruling parties cannot survive leadership transitions, a large 
number of them collapsed after the departure of founding leaders (Meng 2021). 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is an outlier, adaptive and resilient in waves 
of democratization and becoming more institutionalized in past decades (Gehlbach and 
Keefer 2011; Nathan 2003). Despite decentralized market reform, China’s political system 
remains highly centralized (Xu 2011). The CCP still exerts tight control over civil society 
(Mattingly 2020), local state agents (Edin 2003), the economy in strategic sectors 
(Naughton 2017), and the Internet (King, Pan and Roberts 2013). In recent years, however, 
it has further strengthened ruling party control in various organs of rule (the government, 
the military, legislatures, and mass organizations) and initiated massive anti-corruption 
campaigns to enforce party rule and enhance corruption monitoring. 
The overarching puzzle is this: Why does the ruling party strengthen political 
control given that it is such a strong ruling party? What are the intended and unintended 
political consequences of strong ruling party control? 
In this dissertation I use subnational political institutions in China to examine why 
strong ruling party control occurs and evaluates how strong ruling party control shapes 
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local governance. The study of local political institutions may provide valuable insights for 
us to understand micro-level processes of authoritarian institutions, capture subnational 
authoritarian enclaves, and gain better internal validity (Gervasoni 2010; Pepinsky 2019). 
In China’s multilevel government system, local political institutions exhibit large spatial 
and temporal variations, allowing me to capture institutional variations and evaluate 
sources and consequences of local political institutions. 
In this dissertation, I identify two types of ruling party control in China’s multilevel 
political system. First, political control over cadre appointments is an important instrument 
of ruling party control (Edin 2003; Svolik 2012). I employ the dual appointment of top 
party chiefs and congressional chairpersons to capture strong party control over local 
legislatures. Second, corruption crackdown in China is a vital instrument to strengthen the 
party and consolidate the power of dominant party leaders (Lorentzen and Lu 2018). To 
curb corruption, the party relies mainly on the concentration of power in the party 
disciplinary institutions (Yuen 2014). I thus use local corruption investigations of officials 
to capture party discipline of bureaucrats. 
I argue that local social unrest may motivate the ruling party to strengthen control 
over legislatures, and that strong ruling party control is more likely to emerge in areas with 
weak political competition. In addition, the ruling party holds a firm grip on legislatures to 
empower legislative oversights and strengthen party personnel control of local state 
officials. 
I demonstrate that authoritarian regimes may, however, confront a trade-off in their 
attempts to strengthen ruling party control. Strong ruling party control may yield some 
unintended political consequences. More specifically, I show that strong ruling party 
control may dampen bottom-up information flow and degrade the quality of decision-
making, and have no salient consequence with regard to oversight of executive power. I 
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also indicate that strengthened corruption monitoring may reduce the supply of competent 
politicians at the entry level. 
This dissertation can yield a number of contributions. First, I show how the varying 
strength of authoritarian institutions shapes local governance. Most researchers examine 
how the establishment of quasi-democratic institutions shape regime outcomes (e.g., 
Gandhi 2008; Magaloni 2008; Wright 2008). The existence of quasi-democratic 
institutions in nondemocracies may be a poor indicator of institutional strength and have 
limited variation across space and time. Few scholars have opened the black box of 
authoritarian institutions to examine how subtle forms of institutional contents shape 
political actors’ beliefs and behaviors. I fill this gap by estimating the consequences of 
changing power distribution in subnational legislatures for legislators’ behaviors, and by 
examining the impact of corruption monitoring on the supply of politicians at the entry 
level. This dissertation may provide unique evidence of the operations and functions of 
subnational authoritarian institutions. 
Using China as a case, I seek to illustrate the logic and mechanisms of authoritarian 
political selection. Scholars pay considerable attention to the selection of dominant party 
and government leaders who are the most powerful political elites at various levels of 
political units in nondemocracies (e.g., Jia, Kudamatsu and Seim 2015; Landry, Lü and 
Duan 2018; Lee and Schuler 2020; Li and Zhou 2005; Shih et al. 2012). Deviating from 
previous studies, the dissertation focuses on the composition of legislature leaders at the 
prefectural level. I demonstrate that local legislative leaders are less competitive but have 
longer tenure and denser local embeddedness. To maintain political control and loyalty, 
legislative leaders are selected mainly from ruling party leaders rather than professional 
legislators. Moreover, scholars have focused mostly on political selection among 
government officials and examined the demand side of political selection. In China’s one-
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party regime, the pool of public employees matters for the competence of future politicians; 
yet the supply of politicians is underexamined. The dissertation fills this gap by showing 
how and why monitoring institutions may shape the supply of political candidates at the 
entry level. 
Furthermore, the dissertation contributes to the study of power concentration in 
nondemocracies. The basic function of political institutions is to place restrictions on 
executive power and reduce uncertainties by establishing a stable structure for interaction 
(North and Weingast 1989). Authoritarian leaders confront weak institutional checks and 
power constraints; they can manipulate institutional rules and procedures to serve private 
interests and reduce unfavorable results. Personalization of power thus tends to emerge in 
weak institutional environment (Slater 2003). In recent years, the CCP has consolidated 
political control in various fields and political power has become more centralized in 
dominant party leaders (Shirk 2018). I evaluate the political consequences of power 
concentration for local politics. The empirical results demonstrate that power concentration 
of local party leaders may reduce the bottom-up information flow from legislators. 
The dissertation is related to the study of local political institutions in China. Many 
scholars analyze the functions and operations of the National People’s Congress in China 
(e.g., Lü, Liu and Li 2020; O’Brien 1988; Truex 2014). Local congresses are more vibrant 
than the national congress and play a vital role in China’s political system (Manion 2015). 
A growing literature explores the role of local congresses in local politics (Cho 2008; Hou 
2019; Xia 2007). This dissertation adds to this line of research in two ways. First, I 
collected a novel and comprehensive dataset of municipal congresses between 2002 and 
2012. It is among the first attempts to capture local legislative activities such as submission 
of policy proposals, appointment of local state officials, and characteristics of legislative 
leaders. Second, this dissertation examines the relationship of ruling parties and local 
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congresses. It demonstrates that strong ruling party control may shape the functions of local 
congresses. 
OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
In the collection of three essays, I attempt to explore what motivates strong ruling 
party control and how strong ruling party control shapes local politics. I use local people’s 
congresses and local corruption investigations as cases. The structure of this dissertation is 
as follows. 
Chapter 2 illustrates the motivation of strong ruling party control over local 
legislatures and the composition of legislative leaders. I use the dual appointment of local 
party secretaries and chairpersons of congresses to identify strong ruling party control. I 
hypothesize that four possible factors may explain the adoption of dual appointment. First, 
the party adopts dual appointment to elevate the political status of congresses and to 
enhance their bargaining power in the local political arena. Second, the party uses dual 
appointment to strengthen party personnel control of state officials. Third, dual 
appointment is more likely to appear in areas with weak political competition. Fourth, 
social unrest could motivate the party to adopt dual appointment and enhance party control 
over society. I assembled a comprehensive dataset of 1,089 chairmen of congresses in more 
than 300 cities between 2002 and 2012, and tested parts of motivations of dual 
appointment. The empirical results show that social unrest may increase chances of 
adopting dual appointment, and dual appointment is more likely to emerge in cities with 
weak political competition. Moreover, compared with double-mandate chairmen, single-
mandate chairmen are representative of more women and ethnic groups, older, and more 
likely to work in their hometowns; they have less education but enjoy longer tenures, and 
the current position is likely to be the last stop in their political career. These results 
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demonstrate that ruling party leaders tend to be more competent and less embedded in local 
politics than congressional chairmen of the same political rank. 
Chapter 3 evaluates the political consequences of strong ruling party control for 
legislative politics. I argue that authoritarian ruling parties may confront a trade-off in their 
attempts to tightly control legislatures. The ruling party uses dual appointment to elevate 
the political status of congresses and strengthen ruling party control; however, dual 
appointment also facilitates power concentration of local party leaders. It impedes bottom-
up information from legislators and is limited to improve legislative oversights of executive 
power. Empirically, I construct a novel dataset of legislative activities and leadership 
information in around 300 cities between 2002 and 2012. The results demonstrate that 
power concentration of party leaders significantly reduces the number of policy proposals 
from legislators. The reduction effect is more salient when party leaders have better career 
prospects. Legislators have more incentives to suppress their opinions in congresses when 
legislative leaders have better career prospects. A placebo test confirms that the effect is 
not driven by leaders’ personalities or leadership styles. Moreover, I demonstrate that 
power concentration has no significant impact on oversight of executive power and suggest 
that strengthening ruling party control is inadequate to enhance the supervision of 
executive power. I draw a consistent conclusion after using two instrument variables to 
deal with endogeneity concerns. 
In Chapter 4, I examine how and why corruption monitoring institutions shape the 
supply of politicians at the entry level. I combine three waves of the Chinese College 
Student Survey (CCSS) and corruption investigation data to examine the supply of 
potential politicians at the entry level. I demonstrate that corruption monitoring may fail to 
increase the supply of capable political candidates. Instead, the increase in corruption 
investigation pushes capable young elites away from seeking government positions. The 
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results are robust and consistent under different specifications. Specifically, I argue that 
this effect may be driven by two possible mechanisms: economic returns and career 
prospects. First, capable young elites have better prospects for economic returns in the 
private sector; thus, they incur a high opportunity cost if they serve in government. 
Corruption investigations may reduce the expected economic returns for government 
officials, undermining capable young elites’ willingness and efforts to become government 
officials. The empirical results show that capable young elites expect a higher level of 
income, which lowers the likelihood of their seeking a political career. Second, corruption 
investigations may signal the uncertainties and risks of a political career, weakening 
capable young elites’ expectations about their political career prospects. The empirical 
results demonstrate that the downfall of government leaders rather than bureaucrats reduces 
the likelihood that capable young elites compete for government jobs. This reduction effect 
is more pronounced in areas with a prosperous market economy. 
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Chapter 2:  The Ruling Party and Local Congresses in China 
INTRODUCTION 
How do ruling parties control legislatures in authoritarian regimes? Why do 
authoritarian regimes maintain strong party control in legislatures? An emerging literature 
documents that authoritarian parties adopt various strategies to control legislative 
institutions. For instance, the ruling parties can control the nomination and selection of 
delegates (Malesky and Schuler 2010), structure delegates’ policy proposals and policy 
coalitions in non-sensitive policy issues (Lü, Liu and Li 2020; Truex 2016), maintain strong 
agenda control within oversight hearings (Schuler 2020), and co-opt legislative leaders into 
the top ruling party organizations (Nelson and White 1982). These studies provide useful 
insights for us to understand authoritarian legislatures. However, they mainly focus on 
national congresses. We know little about how and why ruling parties control legislatures 
in local congresses. 
Ruling party control over local congresses may have distinct logics. In contrast to 
national congresses, regime survival and longevity are not main concerns for local 
congresses in authoritarian regimes. There is more institutional variation using a 
comparative analysis of subnational jurisdictions, which have an advantage in 
understanding how institutional variations affect political outcomes (Pepinsky 2014). 
Studying political control over local legislative institutions may extend the scope of 
analysis beyond regime survival and economic growth. It may help us understand how and 
why strong ruling parties shape the allocation of power, manage unfavourable results in 
congresses, respond to local challenges, and incentivize bureaucracies. In addition, local 
congresses may be more vibrant than national congresses in nondemocracies. 
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Congressional representation is more likely to be achieved in local congresses, and local 
delegates are more closely linked to citizens (Manion 2015). 
In this study, I use Chinese municipal congresses as a case to identify a new form 
of party control in local congresses: the dual appointment of Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) party secretaries (the highest ranking officials in a prefecture) and chairmen of 
congresses.1 Dual appointment is close to “dual mandate” that a politician simultaneously 
hold two positions. It allows local top party chiefs to directly hold chairmanships of local 
congresses. In addition, dual appointment exhibits regional and temporal variations. On 
average, 38.15% of the congressional chairmanships were held by party secretaries 
between 2002 and 2012. 
I hypothesize that four possible factors may explain the adoption of dual 
appointment. First, the party adopts dual appointment to elevate the political status of 
congresses and enhance their bargaining power in the local political arena. Second, the 
party uses dual appointment to strengthen party personnel control of state officials. Third, 
dual appointment is more likely to appear in areas with weak political competition. Fourth, 
social unrest could motivate the party to adopt dual appointment and enhance party control 
over society. I assembled a comprehensive dataset of 1,089 chairmen of congresses in more 
than 300 cities between 2002 and 2012, and test parts of motivations of dual appointment. 
The basic regression results show that social unrest may increase chances of adopting dual 
appointment, and dual appointment is more likely to emerge in cities with weak political 
competition. 
Moreover, I compare key characteristics of double mandate chairmen and single 
mandate chairmen. In definition, double mandate chairman refers to a local politician who 
 
1 In this study, I use municipal, prefecture, and city interchangeably. All of them refer to the political units 
lie between provinces and counties in China. A prefecture usually controls several counties or urban districts. 
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simultaneously holds two positions: party secretary and congressional chairman. Single 
mandate chairman refers to a local politician who only holds the congressional 
chairmanship. Compared with double mandate chairmen, single mandate chairmen are 
representative of more women and ethnic groups, older, and more likely to work in their 
hometowns; they have attained less education but enjoy longer tenures, and the current 
position is likely to be the last stop of their political career. 
This study contributes to the literature of subnational legislative institutions in 
authoritarian regimes. The study of authoritarian legislatures primarily focuses on the 
origins and consequences of establishing legislatures at national level. Scholars claim that 
autocrats adopt legislatures to facilitate power sharing, co-opt oppositional forces, gather 
information, and generate legitimacy (Gandhi 2008; Svolik 2012; Schuler 2020; Truex 
2016), and legislatures may shape economic growth and regime survival (Jensen, Malesky 
and Weymouth 2014; Wright 2008; Wright and Escribà-Folch 2012). However, little is 
known about composition and routine operation of authoritarian legislatures at different 
levels of government. Deviating from macro-level dynamics, a rising literature examines 
the micro-level behaviors of political actors in authoritarian legislatures. In particular, 
many scholars examine motivations and behaviors of legislators. They delineate the 
structure of delegate incentives in policy coalition building (Lü, Liu and Li 2020), 
delegates’ responsiveness and policy debates (Malesky and Schuler 2010; Schuler 2020), 
the motivations of delegates from the business sector in national and subnational 
legislatures (Hou 2019; Truex 2014), and the parochial representation of congress 
delegates (Manion 2015). Different from democracies, delegates in nondemocracies are 
more restrained by political leadership (Gandhi, Noble and Svolik 2020). This study 
extends this line of research by investigating the compositions and motivations of 
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legislative leaders in local congresses, and examining motivations of ruling parties to 
strengthen control over legislatures.2  
Furthermore, this study contributes to the study of authoritarian political selection 
in two ways. First, as is widely assumed, nondemocracies are less likely to select competent 
political leaders than democracies (Besley and Reynal-Querol 2011). Regime leaders fear 
political challenges from capable subordinates (Ezrow and Frantz 2011), the role of 
competence in cadre promotions diminishes at higher levels of government (Landry, Lü 
and Duan 2018), and technical competence outweighs political competence in promotion 
(Lee and Schuler 2020). This study demonstrates that ruling party leaders are better 
educated than legislative leaders, and legislative positions tend to be the last stop of local 
politicians’ political career in one-party regimes like China. Party leaders tend to be more 
competent than legislative leaders. Second, scholars pay considerable attention to the 
selection of dominant party and government leaders who are the most powerful political 
elites at various levels of political units in nondemocracies (Jia, Kudamatsu and Seim 2015; 
Landry, Lü and Duan 2018; Li and Zhou 2005; Shih et al. 2012; Yao and Zhang 2015). 
The selection of legislative leaders has been largely neglected. Different from democracies 
where legislative leaders are selected from legislators, legislative leadership in 
authoritarian regimes is an instrument for ruling parties to reward loyal cadres (Reuter and 
Turovsky 2014). This study demonstrates that legislative leaders are mainly selected from 
ruling party leaders rather than professional legislators, ruling parties exert tight control 
over legislative leaderships to deal with rising social unrest, strengthen personnel 
appointment, and elevate political status of congresses. 
 
2 In this study, local congresses refer to subnational congresses including provincial, prefectural, and 
county people's congresses in China. 
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THE PARTY AND CONGRESSES IN CHINA 
People’s Congress in China 
Conventional wisdom claims that authoritarian legislatures are merely ceremonial 
or window-dressing. But a growing literature demonstrates that authoritarian legislatures 
can sustain authoritarian rule by facilitating power sharing (Svolik 2012), constraining 
confiscatory behavior (Wright 2008), divide opposition parties (Magaloni 2006), or 
incorporate oppositional forces (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). 
In China’s context, legislative institutions exhibit an evolving role in Chinese 
political system. In the Mao era, especially during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), 
the National People’s Congress (NPC) was just a forum or cheerleader for party rule rather 
than an organization (O’Brien 1988). Standing committees of local congresses didn’t 
emerge until 1979. People’s congresses have expanded power on lawmaking, oversight, 
and representation and become institutionalized since the reform era, and are not merely 
ceremonial or a forum (Gasper 1982; O’Brien 1990a; Xia 2007). In particular, legislatures 
play an active role at both national and local levels. For instance, NPC has bounded 
representation that reveals citizen grievances but prevents destabilizing political activism 
(Truex 2016), and provides a platform for regime insiders to build policy coalitions and set 
policy agenda (Lü, Liu and Li 2020). At the local level, local congresses have constrained 
representation in response to upward flows of information from citizens (Manion 2015), 
and identify public dissatisfaction before an explosive event occurs (Cho 2008). Local 
congresses become an active political force in the political arena. 
However, Chinese local congresses are not professional congresses. Delegates of 
local congresses usually meet once per year; these infrequent meetings make difficult for 
delegates to regularly exercise legislative power. In addition, concurrent seats are common, 
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which means that delegates can sit concurrently at different levels of congresses. For 
instance, a delegate can serve as a legislator at the national, provincial, prefecture, and 
county congresses at the same time. Only delegates at township and county levels are 
elected in party controlled popular elections. County delegates then vote for prefectural 
delegates, prefectural delegates elect provincial delegates, and provincial delegates vote 
for national delegates. These delegates have weak political accountability to their 
constituencies. Most delegates are not professional politicians in congresses, in that a large 
number of them have full-time jobs in other sectors and are not paid for work in congresses 
(Manion 2015). A lot of delegates concurrently work in party organizations, governments, 
state owned enterprises (SOE), and private sectors. Legislators sometimes ratify and 
discuss policies that have already worked out by a small circle of party and government 
officials (Manion 2014). Moreover, delegates have motivations other than representation 
to seek office in local congresses. For instance, entrepreneurs have incentives to hold local 
congress seats in order to deter exploitation and protect property rights (Hou 2019). 
Legislators from government and party organizations have stronger incentives of career 
advancements than public representation. 
Meanwhile, the standing committees of local congresses carry out much of the work 
in the broader chamber. Starting from 1979, the standing committees of local people’s 
congresses were established at and above the county level. Compared with delegates in 
congresses, members of standing committees, which are smaller in size, meet frequently. 
Figure 2.1 depicts the distribution of annual meeting frequency of standing committees in 
MPCs. On average, members of standing committees meet 7.6 times in a year; about 85% 
of municipal standing committees meet between six and nine times. Members of standing 
committees play a dominant role in leading the election of delegates at the same level, 
making laws, appointing or removing state officials, and supervising state power at normal 
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times as well as meeting at least once every two months. In addition, standing committees 
have fewer members than local congresses. According to the Organic Law, the size of 
municipal standing committee shall be between 13 to 35 members and for populous cities 
cannot exceed 45. The average number of delegates at municipal congresses is 369 in my 
dataset.3 The smaller size of standing committee enables legislators to deliberate and 




Figure 2.1: Meeting Frequency of Standing Committee in MPC 
Notes: The figure plots the distribution of meeting frequency for members of standing committee in 
each year between 2002 and 2012. The red line indicates the average frequency, the mean value of 
meeting frequency is 7.61. Around 0.5% of prefectures had meeting frequencies larger than 20. The 
figure doesn’t include these observations. 
 
3 The yearbooks of most cities reported how many delegates attended the annual conference; the number 
is close to but lower than the actual number of delegates. The average number is calculated based on the 
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Chairman of Local Congresses 
The chairman of the local congress is directly in charge of the standing committee 
and summons its conferences, and is responsible for the routine operation of congress.4 In 
China’s political hierarchy system, chairmen of local congresses have the same 
administrative rank as top party and government leaders in the same political units. For 
instance, at the prefecture level, chairmen of municipal congresses are at Bureau Director 
rank (Zheng Ting ji) and have the same political ranking as party secretaries and mayors. 
However, chairmen of congresses are politically weak. Positions of legislative leaders are 
used to reward loyal officials who may lack required competence for the “main” game in 
China (Hillman 2010). Some studies even treat the move from party secretaries to 
legislative leaders as retirement, which signals the loss of power in the political system (Li 
and Zhou 2005; Yao and Zhang 2015). 
The party holds tight control over the selection of chairmen in congresses. Party 
control over the appointment of officials is fundamental to China’s economic development 
and political stability in the reform era (Landry 2008; Xu 2011), and the chairmanship of 
people’s congresses is no exception. According to the Organic Law,5 the chairman is 
nominated by the presidium of deputies, which is elected by deputies and mainly includes 
top party and government officials, leaders of non-Communist parties, and congressional 
leaders. Then congressional delegates vote for the chairman candidates. In practice, the 
party, especially upper-level party committees, decides and nominates the candidates of 
chairman, and then local congressional delegates rubberstamp the appointment. The 
election of chairmen is usually a single-candidate election. 
 
4 The official tile of chairman is chairman of the standing committee of the people's congresses. 
5 The Organic Law refers to the Organic Law of the People's Republic of China in the Local People's 
Congresses and Local People's Governments (hereafter Organic Law). It was released in 1979, and amended 
in 1982, 1986, 1995, 2004, and 2015. For the full version of the law before 2002, see 
www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/06/content_5004478.htm 
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The Ruling Party and Congresses 
The party and congresses have exhibited a dynamic relationship over the decades. 
Though congresses rarely challenge the party and government decisions (O’brien 1994), 
party control over congresses has changed over time. In the Mao era, legislative institutions 
were established but had limited influence, and experienced stagnation and regression 
(O’brien 1990b). Congresses were ceremonial or symbolic. 
In the post-Mao period the party’s top leaders reflected the disastrous consequences 
of the Cultural Revolution. Congresses reemerged and became more institutionalized to 
constrain cults of personality and expand their functions. In a famous 1980 speech entitled 
“On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership”, Deng Xiaoping pointed out 
that the major problems of the leadership of the party and the state are “bureaucracy, 
overconcentration of power, patriarchal methods, life tenure in leading posts and privileges 
of various kinds” (Deng 1994). In addition, he asserted that holding two or more posts 
concurrently was improper for leaders and that having too many deputy positions led to 
poor efficiency and facilitated bureaucracy formalism (Deng 1994). Before 1989 reformers 
were devoted to solving the problem of power concentration and promoting the separation 
of party and state. For instance, the report of the 13th National Congresses of the CCP 
claimed to gradually repeal party committees in government organizations and clarify 
boundaries between the party and state.6 
Political movements in 1989 and the collapse of communist political institutions in 
the Soviet Union sounded an alarm for the party and prompted a dramatic policy change. 
The party strengthened police and security forces to maintain social stability (Wang and 
Minzner 2015), and more patriotic education sites were built to indoctrinate young people 
 
6 For the report of the 13th National Congresses of the CCP, see http://www.gov.cn/test/2007-08/ 
29/content_730445.htm 
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(Liu and Ma 2018). And the party enhanced its control over congresses at different levels. 
In 1990 Jiang Zemin, then the top party leader, asserted that the people’s congress was the 
institution led by the party and that only under party leadership could people’s congresses 
function well.7 At provincial level, a growing number of provincial party secretaries began 
to serve as chairpersons of provincial people’s congresses since 1992 (Xia 2007, 3). By 
2003, 24 of 31 provinces adopted the dual appointment of provincial party secretaries and 
congress chairmen. 
At present, the party has several strategies to control congresses. For instance, the 
party controls the delegates ratio of CCP members and is influential in selecting legislators 
(O’brien 1990b). Communist party members occupy more than half of delegate seats, and 
a large proportion of those are party and government officials. Moreover, the party selects 
and nominates candidates for official of state positions, and then submits the recommended 
candidates to the congresses for voting. In this way, the party controls the appointment of 
officials in governments, the courts, and the procuracy. 
Another typical party strategy for controlling congresses is the dual appointment: 
the appointment of the party secretary to the chairmanship of local congresses. The dual 
appointment enables the party to be directly involved in the operation of local congresses. 
In terms of dual appointment, party control over congresses tends to be weaker at the lower 
level of subnational units. Most provinces adopts dual appointment, and the proportion 
diminishes at prefecture and county level. In specific, at the provincial level, the party 
control over congresses has been strengthened over time. In 1997, the dual appointment of 
the party secretary and congress chairman existed in only seven provinces. In 2002, the 
central party committee required that all provincial party secretaries should hold the chairs 
 
7 Central Chinese Communist Party Literature Research Office, ed. “Selection of Important Documents 
since the Thirteenth Party Congress”. Volume 2. Beijing: People's Press, 1991. 
 18 
of the congresses except for members of the Political Bureau. Since 2003, party secretaries 
have been the chairmen of provincial congresses in approximately 24 provinces or 77.42% 
of all provincial units in mainland China.8  At the prefecture level, the dual appointment 
was adopted in 38.15% of prefectures between 2002 and 2012, but the percentage has 
declined since 2009. No systematic data are available for dual appointments at the county 
level. Scholars who have sampled parts of counties show that approximately 15% of them 
adopted dual appointment in 2015 (Qiu and Song 2016). The differences in dual 
appointments suggest that direct party control over legislatures is weaker at lower levels, 
and that congresses may have more autonomy in these local political units. 
 
MOTIVATIONS OF DUAL APPOINTMENT 
In this study I select the municipal (or prefecture) people’s congress as a typical 
case and examine the underlying motivations for the party to adopt dual appointment. 
China is a regionally decentralized authoritarian regime (Xu 2011), the liveliest congresses 
appear in the localities below (Manion 2015, 16). Prefectures lie between provinces and 
counties, and prefecture governments are a critical component of China’s multilevel 
government system. The study of municipal congresses may provide valuable insights for 
us to understand the operation of subnational legislatures in a one-party regime. Moreover, 
prefectures are the lowest political units that systematically record annual legislative 
activities in publicly available yearbooks, which makes it possible to capture institutional 
variations of subnational legislatures across space and time. 
I hypothesize four possible factors motivate the CCP to name local party secretaries 
the chairmen of local congresses. First, the dual appointment could elevate the political 
 
8 In Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Guangdong, and Xinjiang, party secretaries are members of 
the Political Bureau. In those areas, chairmanships of congresses are held by separate leaders. In Tibet, the 
chairmanship of the congress is held by a separate ethnic leader.  
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status of congresses and enhance the bargaining power of the congresses in local political 
arena. Second, dual appointment is most likely for units that experience less political 
competition. Third, the dual appointment may strengthen party control of personnel and 
allows party secretaries to be involved in all procedures of cadre appointment. Fourth, 
concerns about social stability may incentivize the party to adopt dual appointment and 
increase party control over society. 
Political Status and Dual Appointment 
In this section, I discuss the logic that the party may have incentives to elevate the 
political status of congresses by adopting dual appointment. Numerous scholars 
demonstrate that authoritarian regimes have incentives to adopt binding institutions to 
maintain authoritarian rule (e.g., Gandhi 2008; Svolik 2012; Wright 2008). China is no 
exception. Supervision of governments is one of the key functions of congresses. Political 
ranking within the party matters for the authority of leaders and organizations under one-
party rule. As chief party leaders, party secretaries can directly hold the chairmanships of 
congresses, empowering local congresses and bolstering congresses’ bargaining power in 
the political system. 
Local congresses are responsible for supervising governments and judicial organs. 
Based on the law governing the supervision of local congresses,9 congressional standing 
committees is responsible for supervising government, the courts, and the procuratorate at 
the same level. In particular, congressional standing committees supervise governments by 
supervising and approving budgets, hearing and discussion plans for social and economic 
 
9 The law refers to the “Law of the People's Republic of China on the Supervision of Standing Committees 
of the People's Congresses at Various Levels." The law, passed in 2006, has been in effect since 2007. For 
the English version of the law, see http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=5421&lib=law. 
 20 
development, and inspecting law enforcement. Mayors’ work reports must be discussed by 
all delegates and voted on at the annual conference of congresses. 
The political status of chairmen in local congresses matters for government 
supervision. The political status within the party of mayors concurrently holding the post 
of vice party secretary is just below that of the party secretaries. Both mayors and executive 
vice mayors occupy two positions in the standing committee of the communist party, 
whose members are the most powerful leaders and control massive resources at the local 
level. On paper, chairmen of local congresses are ranked second in the local political arena, 
but single mandate chairmen are not members of the standing committees of the communist 
party. They possess limited bargaining power and leverage in the allocation of resources 
and have inadequate authority to monitor governments. Instead, local congresses rely on 
governments to provide resources such as operation funds and offices, which may weaken 
the legislative supervision of governments. 
Dual appointments could elevate the political status of local congresses and 
empower the chairmen of the congresses. In democracies like France, dual mandates 
emerge when parties cannot provide adequate resources, and dual mandates can weaken 
partisan attachment and cohesion (Cirone 2017; Costa and Kerrouche 2009). In China’s 
one party system, dual appointment may bring more resources and increase ruling party 
control. The ruling party widely uses dual appointment to allocate more policy attention 
and resources in urgent or important issues. For instance, confronting challenges rising 
from society, the party incorporates local public security chiefs into the top party elites 
team, allowing them to have larger bargaining power and obtain more public security funds 
(Wang 2014). Similarly, party secretaries directly holding the chairmanship of congresses 
elevate the political status of congresses and enable them to have more bargaining power 
in the supervision of governments. In addition, when party secretaries hold the 
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chairmanship of congresses, turning the party’s will into law and involvement in the agenda 
setting of legislative activities are easier. 
Personnel Control and Dual Appointment 
In this subsection I propose that dual appointments could enhance party control 
over the appointment and removal of state officials. Under the dual appointment, party 
secretaries take part in all procedures involved in cadre appointment: from candidate 
recommendation to congress election. It allows the ruling party to avoid election losses and 
effectively appoint preferred candidates as state officials and strengthens the power of party 
secretaries over personnel, giving them leverage over governments. 
On paper, state officials should be elected and approved by local congresses in 
China. 10  State officials constitute three groups: congressional officials, government 
officials, and judicial officials. In addition to the appointment of congressional officials, 
municipal people’s congresses are responsible for the election of main government and 
judicial officials. Government positions include the mayor, vice mayor, secretary general 
of the government, and directors of government branches. Judicial positions include the 
chief procurator of the municipal people’s procuratorate, the president of the intermediate 
people’s court, and other judicial officials. 
Nevertheless, election to the local congresses is only one of the procedures involved 
in cadre appointment. In China, the ruling party has the dominant authority in the 
nomenklatura system to appoint, promote, and remove officials (Manion 1985). 
Regulations for the Selection and Appointment of Leading Party and Government Cadres 
 
10 In reports of local congresses, the term “state personnel" (guojia jiguan gongzuo renyuan) is used. 
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(hereafter Regulations) includes key principles and procedures of cadre appointment.11  
The first and foremost principle of the Regulations is that the party is responsible for 
administering the appointment and selection of cadres. 
In practice, the appointment and removal of officials follows several procedures. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the primary procedures. The first is democratic recommendation. To 
determine lists of candidates, a democratic process of recommendation is essential. 
Recommendation involves several persons: members of party committees, main members 
of the standing committee of congresses, government and Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC) committee members, and other leaders at the next lower 
level. The second step is appraisal. 12  Selected candidates are assessed by the party 
organization department. Similarly, the scope of individuals whose opinions are solicited 
include party, legislative, government, and CPPCC leaders as well as leading members of 
the candidates’ work institutions. The third procedure is deliberation, which still takes 
place among leading members of the party, congress, government, and CPPCC. The fourth 
is discussion and decision. After collective discussion the party committee, especially the 
standing party committee, casts a vote and decides the appointment or removal of an 
official. The final candidates are determined through this procedure. To appoint or remove 
state officials, the final step is approval by the local congresses. The party committees 
submit the recommended candidates to the congresses, and then members of congressional 
 
11 Regulations, issued by the Organization Department of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, 
serves as a guide for central and local party organizations to manage cadre appointments. Since 2000, three 
versions of Regulations for the Selection and Appointment of Leading Party and Government Cadres were 
written. The first, released in 2002, was effective until 2014. The second was released in 2014 and included 
adjustments and revisions. The third version was released in 2019. The purpose of the current study is to 
examine legislative activities between 2002 and 2012; thus, I rely primarily on the 2002 version to depict 
personnel procedures and requirements. The English version of the Regulation can be found at 
www.china.org.cn/english/congress/226530.htm 
12 Based on Regulations, the recommendation and nomination of the mayor is determined by the provincial 
party committees. Other state officials are nominated by the prefecture party committee. 
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standing committees vote for the recommended candidates. Candidates must receive more 
than half of votes in congresses before legal appointment or removal. 
 
Figure 2.2: The Appointment and Removal Procedure of State Officials 
Notes: The figure is based on the “Regulation on the Selection and Appointment of the Party 
and Government Leaders”. The box indicates a specific procedure. The bullet point around each 
box shows the key actors involving in this procedure. 
 
These procedures imply that the party is the key actor in the first four procedures. 
As the chief party leader, party secretaries are influential and pivotal in the 
recommendation and appraisal of candidates as well as in deliberations and decisions. In 
the fifth procedure, the vote of the local congresses on the recommended candidates tends 
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to be ceremonial; however, under some circumstances, party-recommended candidates fail 
to secure the necessary votes in the local congresses and are hence ineligible for legal 
appointment. For instance, Manion (2008) shows that 2.08% of party-nominated 
candidates between 1997 and 1999 lost in the elections of municipal congresses. Although 
the losses of party-nominated candidates are rare, the failure of election in local congresses 
could weaken the authority of party committees and signal the unpopularity of candidates, 
who cannot win support even in a highly controlled election. 
Moreover, leaders of local congresses could prolong the procedures of cadre 
appointment. Even in strong authoritarian regimes like China, divisions within the ruling 
coalition could generate legislative gridlock (Truex 2020). As shown in Figure 2.2, the 
main leaders of local congresses can express their opinions in the nomination and 
assessment of candidates. In fact, their concerns and disputes could prolong the procedures 
of appointment and removal of state officials. In short, party-preferred candidates confront 
obstacles to legal and effective appointment. 
The dual appointment of party secretaries and chairmen of local congresses could 
strengthen party control over the appointment and removal of state officials. When party 
secretaries directly hold the chairs of local congresses, they take part in all the procedures 
involved in the appointment and removal of state officials. Even in the voting procedures 
of local congresses, they could coordinate members of standing committees in local 
congresses and pass their preferred candidates. In this way, the dual appointment empowers 
party secretaries and makes them more influential in cadre management and enhances the 
party control of personnel. 
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Political Competition and Dual Appointment 
In this subsection I hypothesize that political competition may reduce the chance of 
dual appointment. Dual appointment reduces the number of positions at Bureau Director 
rank and shrinks local officials’ probability of promotion. The problem becomes more 
severe in areas with intense interjurisdiction competition. 
In authoritarian regimes, leaders share spoils and power with allies to gain support 
and loyalty (Geddes et al. 2018). Promoting local officials is an important channel for 
leaders to build patronage networks (Jiang 2018), and incentivizes them to implement 
policy preferences from above (Huang 1996). However, official positions are limited. The 
number of posts declines as administrative rank increases. 
In China, local officials confront fierce interjurisdiction competition. Despite vice 
provincial cities, Bureau Director rank (Zheng Ting ji) is the highest political ranking in 
each city. There are four positions at this rank in each prefecture: party secretaries, mayors, 
chairmen of congresses, and chairmen of CPPCC. When party secretaries hold the 
chairmanships of congresses, it reduces one position of Bureau Director rank. As a result, 
dual appointment could reduce the chances of promotion for officials such as vice party 
secretaries and vice mayors. 
Political competition is more intense when the number of officials accountable to 
the same principal is larger, and the number of counties in a city can be the proxy for the 
intensity of interjurisdiction political competition (Lü and Landry 2014). When prefecture-
level governments control more counties, it fuels intense political competition. In China’s 
multilevel political system, local leaders’ career advancements are controlled by upper-
level governments. Their expected chance of promotion is lower when more county party 
secretaries and heads are eligible to compete for higher positions within the same 
prefecture. 
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Dual appointment reduces local political elites’ chances of career advancements in 
areas with fierce political competition. In particular, dual appointment reduces one senior 
position at the Bureau Director rank. and generates a ripple effect on cadre appointments. 
It lowers the chances of promotion for local vice mayors or vice party secretaries, and then 
reduces one vacant position at the vice Bureau Director rank, county party secretaries are 
thus less likely to be promoted to the vice Bureau Director rank under dual appointment. 
This problem deteriorates in regions with intense political competition. 
To maintain elites’ loyalty, dual appointment may become less likely in areas with 
more intense political competition. In authoritarian regimes, limit access to spoils could 
fuel elite defections (Reuter and Szakonyi 2019). Despite material benefits, power 
positions are important sources of spoils. Providing access to higher power positions can 
maintain elite loyalty and incentivize local elites to implement policies from above. The 
separation of party secretaries and chairmen of congresses could increase one more 
position at Bureau Director rank. It incentivizes local officials to signal competence and 
loyalty. As a result, dual appointment may be less likely to emerge in regions with fierce 
political competition. 
Social Control and Dual Appointment 
In this section I evaluate the hypothesis the social stability concern that may drive 
the adoption of dual appointment. Compared with party secretaries, single mandate 
chairmen have dense local networks, which are likely to be captured by local interests. 
They may have weak career incentives to improve local governance and monitor 
governments. When local cities experience more social unrest, the ruling party may adopt 
dual appointment to strengthen the power of party secretaries and enhance party control 
over the society. 
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First, single mandate chairmen may have a greater chance of being captured by 
local interests. Between 2002 and 2012, a total of 46.2% of single mandate chairmen 
worked in the same city where they were born and raised. In China’s political system, 
typical political leaders are those who enter politics at a young age and climb the 
administrative ladder from below (Landry, Lü and Duan 2018). The overlap of hometown 
and working places implies that a large proportion of those single mandate chairmen spend 
their entire political career in their hometowns. They tend to have dense social ties and are 
embedded in local interests. Under decentralized institutional arrangements, leaders with 
strong local linkages could be captured by local interests and engender widespread political 
dissatisfaction (Mattingly 2016). Single mandate chairmen may be more likely to be 
captured by local interests and form alliances with local political and economic elites, 
which can result in negative consequences for local governance. In particular, local 
congresses have the function of lawmaking, and local-born leaders may formalize local 
interests into law and policies. For parties intervening local legislative politics becomes 
difficult. 
In contrast, party secretaries are more likely to be rotated and have weak local 
linkages. The Regulations for the Selection and Appointment of Leading Party and 
Government Cadres includes the rule of avoidance, which clearly states that party 
secretaries and mayors “shall not normally serve in the place where he or she grew up.” As 
discussed in a later section, party secretaries have a shorter tenure and are more frequently 
transferred than single mandate chairmen. They have weak linkages, and tend to be 
outsiders in local cities. They heavily rely on upper-level party committees to obtain 
resources and support. When local politicians confront strong local political rivals, they 
have incentives to employ public expenditure as a patronage strategy to win local support 
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(Lü and Liu 2019). As a result, dual appointments may reduce local elite capture in 
congresses and strengthen control of congresses by party organizations from above. 
Moreover, party secretaries have strong career incentives to maintain social 
stability and improve local governance. A congressional chairmanship is usually the last 
stop in a single mandate chairman’s political career. She or he is likely to retire after the 
current position and has weak career incentives because of marginal chances to be 
promoted. Party secretaries, however, fall under the “target responsibility system.” Both 
social stability and economic performance are key indicators in their assessments, yet 
economic performance matters little for career advancement among prefecture party 
leaders (Landry, Lü and Duan 2018). Political stability becomes more salient and 
important. The occurrence of large-scale mass unrest could be a “black mark” on the 
political career of local leaders (Wang 2014). They could be blamed by higher level 
officials if a large number of discontented citizens petition and appeal to the provincial and 
central government (O’Brien 2006). The optimal strategy for local leaders is, therefore, to 
identify social grievances before they erupt. A number of studies document that threats of 
collective action push local officials to respond to citizens and provide constituency 
services (Chen, Pan and Xu 2016; Distelhorst and Hou 2017). Local party leaders have 
strong incentives to improve local governance and avoid social unrest. 
Direct control of local congresses allows party secretaries to have better control of 
local politics for their own political power. Local legislatures could offer a formal and 
peaceful channel to identify public dissatisfaction before an explosive event occurs (Cho 
2008) and reveals information about the strength of public preferences (Malesky and 
Schuler 2011; Manion 2015; Truex 2016). Local congresses usually have petition offices, 
which are responsible for receiving and acting on petitions from local citizens. These 
offices allow party leaders to have an extra channel to collect information about local 
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grievances. Local legislators also submit policy proposals, comments, and suggestions to 
the congresses. The dual appointment of party and legislative positions enables party 
secretaries to collect more local information from below and improve governance. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Dual Appointment and Social Stability 
Notes: The left figure compares the average number of protests in party-secretary chairmen and non-
party secretary chairmen in the previous year. The right figures plots the proportion of dual appointment 
and average protests. 
 
Some evidence suggests that social stability concerns may motivate the adoption of 
dual appointment at the prefectural level. Figure 2.3 illustrates social unrest and dual 
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appointment.13 The figure on the left compares the average number of protests in cities 
with double mandate chairmen and single mandate chairmen during the previous year. The 
implication is that cities tend to have more protests before party secretaries hold the 
congressional chairmanships than those with single mandate chairmen. The figure on the 
right plots the average city-level protests and the proportion of dual appointments between 
2002 and 2012. It shows that social unrest and dual appointments tend toward similar 
trends. Local social unrest kept surging and reached its peak in 2009 after the 2008 global 
financial crisis. Similarly, the proportion of dual appointments was the highest in 2009, 
after which both social unrest and dual appointment declined. Figure 3 only shows 
illustrative links of social unrest and dual appointments. In the empirical section, I will test 
the argument in detail. 
 
DATA 
In this study, I collect detailed biographic information on chairmen of municipal 
congresses and identify various legislative activities. One key challenge in studying 
authoritarian legislatures is accessing and collecting data, due to the secrecy of 
authoritarian institutions (Gandhi, Noble and Svolik 2020). But China keeps good records 
of local legislative activities and leaders, allowing me to unearth rich information of 
legislative politics. 
This study covers the period between 2002 and 2012, chosen for two reasons. First, 
systematic data are available for this period. Many cities published no yearbooks until 
early 2000.14  Obtaining data on legislative leaders before 2000 is therefore difficult. It is 
 
13 The social unrest data is from the Social Unrest in China (SUIC) dataset constructed by Ong (2015). 
14 For instance, most prefectures in Tibet had no city yearbooks before 2010. Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, 
published its first yearbook in 2012, so the sample excludes Tibet in the analysis. 
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also important to note that it is difficult also acquire detailed biographic information of 
single mandate chairmen of local congresses than that of party secretaries. Second, local 
power dynamics could be affected by the leadership styles of top leaders. After 2012, China 
strengthened ruling party control over the state, and power became more concentrated in 
party leaders (Shirk 2018), possibly changing local leaders’ career incentives and altering 
local power dynamics. The massive anti-corruption campaign initiated in 2013 could have 
altered local leaders’ political behaviors. To mitigate this concern, I restrict the analysis 
between 2002 and 2012. 
Biographic information on chairmen was collected from multiple sources. First, I 
rely on each province’s yearbook to obtain names of prefectural party secretaries and 
chairmen of people’s congresses. In the year of political turnover, I confirm the party and 
legislative leaders who stayed in the position for more than six months or the longest time. 
Second, individual characteristics of chairmen in recent years were obtained from 
government websites, city yearbooks, and media reports. In the early periods, the 
information of most chairmen is not available in government websites or encyclopedia. 
Thus, I also relied on local gazetteers, biographies of historical communist party 
personages, and other historical materials to get information on chairmen. Figure B1 shows 
an example of how the biographic information of one chairman was collected from party 
organizational materials. 
Legislative variables come from each city’s annual yearbook. In China, most 
prefectures published a yearbook for each year that summarizes local political, economic, 
and social developments of the previous year. Each yearbook contains a chapter on the 
local people’s congress, recording various legislative activities occurring in the previous 
year. Officials in the local people’s congress are responsible for writing the chapter. 
Yearbooks contain the most comprehensive and systematic records of legislative activities 
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for each year. To identify legislative activities, such as the number of legislators, policy 
proposals submitted by legislators, and the number of personnel appointment and removal, 
I examined the legislative chapters for each city between 2002 and 2012 and obtained 
relevant variables. To date, I have successfully collected policy proposal information from 
2,440 city yearbooks. Figure B2 shows an example of how to identify legislative variables 
in a city’s yearbook. 
 
Figure 2.4: Most Frequent Words of MPC Reports (2002-2012) 
Using all text materials in city yearbooks, I plot the word cloud of keywords in 
Figure 2.4 after removing punctuation, blanks, numbers, and stop words. The most frequent 
words include “work”, “report”, “chairman”, “delegates”, “development”, “construction”, 
and “government”. Figure 2.5 indicates the word clouds by year. These words show that 
chairmen and delegates play an important role in the operation of congresses, and economic 
development was a critical priority in local congresses between 2002 and 2012. To 
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compare keywords across years, Figure 2.6 presents the frequency of several key words 
across years. In general, while the number of occurrences of both “delegates” and 
“chairman” rises during the 2002-2012 period, that of “delegates” increases more rapidly 
than “chairman”. “Party committee” had the largest frequency in 2005, and then declined, 





Figure 2.5: Most Frequent Words of MPC Reports by Year 
 
DYNAMIC TRENDS OF DUAL APPOINTMENT 
In this section I illustrate the dynamic trends of dual appointment at the municipal 
level. Dual appointment has substantial temporal and spatial variations. Figure 2.7 plots 
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the trend of the dual appointment of the party secretary and chairman at MPCs. On average, 
38.15% of the chairmanships were held by party secretaries between 2002 and 2012. 
Beginning in 2002, more party secretaries became the chairmen of local congresses, the 
percentage gradually increasing from 31.48% to 43.56% in 2009. The trend then reversed 
after 2009 and the proportion of dual appointments fell. In 2012, 30.77% of prefectures 
had dual appointments of party secretaries and chairmen of congresses, the lowest point. 




Figure 2.6: Word Frequency of Key Words 
Notes: “Delegates” is the total word frequency of “delegates” and “people’s congress delegates”. 
“Supervision” refers to jiandu in Chines. “Party committee” refers to municipal party committee. 
 
The dual appointments exhibit substantial spatial variations. Figure 2.8 presents the 
spatial variations of dual appointments in 2002 and 2012. Most prefectures in western 
China had no dual appointment. A large of number are ethnic autonomous regions, where 
 35 
party secretaries and congressional chairmen are held by different ethnic groups. Eastern 




Figure 2.7: The Trend of Dual Appointment in MPC 
 
Figure 2.9 demonstrates the trend of dual appoint by province. Three main patterns 
emerge. First, some provinces had no dual appointments throughout the entire period. 
These provinces include Hebei, Shanxi, Hunan, Guizhou, Yunnan, and Qinghai, where the 
positions of secretaries and congressional chairmen are held by different leaders. In Jilin, 
Henan, and Liaoning, dual appointments did not exist in most prefectures and years. 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Year 
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Second, many provinces had a high percentage of dual appointments. Around 80% of 







Figure 2.8: Distribution of Dual Appointment in 2002 and 2012 
 
Anhui, and Guangxi. The percentage is comparatively stable across the periods. Similarly, 
about half of prefectures in Jiangsu and Zhejiang adopted dual appointments. 
Furthermore, several provinces experienced a sharp change in dual appointment 
before and after 2009. Take Sichuan province as an example. Only 4.76% of its prefectures 
had dual appointments in 2002, but the percentage continued to surge, reaching 80.95% in 
2009, when the party committee of Sichuan province issued a document on strengthening 
the work of the people’s congress. The document mentioned that chairmanships of 
congresses in prefectures and counties can be held by party secretaries or other proper 
leaders. Prefectures gradually adopted the separation of party secretaries and congress 
chairmen when a prefecture began a new five-year term political cycle. The percentage of 
dual appointments then began to decline and fell to zero in 2012. Similarly, in provinces 
including Fujian, Jiangxi, Shaanxi, Gansu, and Inner Mongolia, the proportion of dual 
appointments noticeably dropped after 2009. 
One possible reason is that 2009 was the 30th anniversary of establishing local 
congressional standing committees in China. Leaders of National People’s Congresses 
advocated to improve local legislative institutions on lawmaking and oversights of 
executive power, and optimize compositions of congressional standing committees.15  To 
enhance local legislative institutions, many provinces gradually reduced dual appointments 
at prefectural level. 
 







Figure 2.9: The Trend of Dual Appointment by Province 
 
WHO BECOMES CHAIRMAN OF MPC? 
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Characteristics of Chairmen 
In this section, I describe the characteristics of chairmen of MPCs and compare 
these traits in double mandate chairmen and single mandate chairmen. In summary, typical 
chairmen of municipal congresses are around 56, male, and Han; they stay in office for 
approximately three years, have completed at least a college education, and are former or 
current party officials. Compared with double mandate chairmen, single mandate chairmen 
tend to be older, representative of more female and ethnic groups, and more likely to work 
in their hometowns; they have attained less education and enjoy longer tenures; 
furthermore, the current position is likely to be the last stop of their political career. The 




Figure 2.10: Last Position of Chairman in MPC 
Notes: The left figure indicates the formal position of chairman of MPC, the right figure indicates the 
position distribution in different agencies. PPCC refers to People’s Political Consultative Conference. 
 
The Last Positions of Chairmen. The party maintains a tight control over the 
appointment of chairmen in local congresses. Party officials are the primary source of 




Figure 2.11: Age Distribution of Chairman in MPC 
Notes: The red line indicates the mean value in each sample. The average age of chairman is, 
respectively, 55.56, 51.79, 58.14 . I conduct a simple t-test and compare the mean age between two 
 
16 The dual appointment as chairman of a MPC and party secretary is a critical dimension of this study. To 
compare other positions of chairmen, I coded the last position of dual appointments as the current party 
secretary. 
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groups. The t-statistic is 50.98 and shows that age of non-party secretary chairmen is significantly larger 
than the age of party-secretary chairmen. 
 
on the left demonstrates detailed last positions for chairmen before moving to their current 
position. These positions include party secretary, vice party secretary, mayor, vice mayor, 
vice chairman of the local congress, and other party and government positions. In the figure 
on the right, I categorize these positions into four types. The results reveal that 83.4% of 
chairmen were selected from party officials, 11.6% of them were former government 
officials, and only 1.8% of chairmen were directly promoted from the position of vice 
chairmen of the local congress. Most chairmen were standing committee members in the 
local party before moving to their current position. 
 
 
Figure 2.12: Age Distribution of First Year in Office for Chairman in MPC 
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Notes: The red line indicates the mean value in each sample. The average age of chairman is, 
respectively, 53.29, 50.64, and 56.04 . I conduct a simple t-test and compare the mean age between two 
groups. The t-statistic is 16.76 and shows that non-party secretary chairmen is significantly older than 
party-secretary chairmen in their first year in office. 
Age. In general, single mandate chairmen are older. Panel A of Figure 2.11 plots 
the age distribution of all chairmen in the sample. The average age of chairman is 55.56. 
A large age spread ranges from 39 to 67. Panel B shows the age distribution of chairmen 
who are party secretaries at the same time. The mean value of age is 51.79; the maximum 
age is 60. Panel C shows the age distribution of single mandate chairmen. The average age 
is 58.17, and age varies from 43 to 67. 
 
Figure 2.13: Age Distribution of Last Year in Office for Chairman in MPC 
Notes: The red line indicates the mean value in each sample. The average age of chairman is, 
respectively, 56.58, 52.70, and 59.97. 
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Holding the position of chairmen extends a leader’s political career. Local 
congresses tend to become the last stop for single mandate chairmen in their political 
careers. Except for several vice-provincial cities,17 all city party secretaries and chairmen 
of people’s congresses have the rank of Bureau Director (Zheng Tingji). They are usually  
 
 
Figure 2.14: Tenure Distribution of Chairman in MPC 
Notes: The red line indicates the mean value in each sample. The average tenure of chairman is, 
respectively, 3.249, 2.559, 3.679 . I conduct a simple t-test and compare the mean tenure between two 
groups. The t-statistic is 15.83 and shows that average tenure of non-party secretary chairmen is 
significantly larger than that of party-secretary chairmen. 
 
 
17 Of the fifteen vice-provincial cities in China, most of them are capitals of the provinces. They include 
Changchun, Chengdu, Dalian, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Harbin, Ji'nan, Nanjing, Ningbo, Qingdao, Shenyang, 
Shenzhen, Wuhan, Xi'an, and Xiamen. In these cities, the party secretaries and chairmen of people's 
congresses hold the rank of deputy minister. 
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ineligible for promotion to the political rank of vice-minister after the age of 55. Some 
studies of Chinese local politics even treat the move from party secretaries to legislative 
leaders as retirement, which signals the loss of power in the political system (Li and Zhou 
2005; Yao and Zhang 2015). Figure 2.12 indicates the distribution of age when leaders are 
in their first year in office. On average, chairmen of congresses are 53.29 in the first year 
of office; double mandate chairmen are 50.64, and single mandate chairmen are 56.04. It 
shows that single mandate chairmen reach the age ceiling for promotion. Local congresses 
tend to be the last stop of their political career. 
In the sample all party secretaries left their position before 60; however, 23.24% of 
single mandate chairmen remain in office after 60.18 This partly explains why some local 
leaders retire from the most prestigious party secretary positions and are willing to hold 
chairmanships of local congresses. In the sample 4.5% of chairmen are retired party 
secretaries. Figure 2.13 plots the age distribution of chairmen when they were in the last 
year of their office. Panel A shows that chairmen left office at around age 56.58. Panel B 
implies that double mandate chairmen were 52.70 in the last year of dual appointment. 
Panel C shows the age distribution of single mandate chairmen; the average age in the last 
year was 59.97. More than 75% of them were of an age equal to or greater than 58. Half of 
them reached 60 in their last year. Party secretaries still have prospects to be promoted or 
transferred to other positions, but single mandate chairmen tend to retire. 
 
18 The percentage excludes vice-provincial level cities. 
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Figure 2.15: Education distribution of Chairman in MPC 
Notes: I conduct a simple t-test and compare the mean education level between two groups. The t-
statistic is -36.17 and shows that non-party secretary chairmen is significantly less educated than party-
secretary chairmen. 
 
Length of Tenure. Single mandate chairmen have longer tenures. Panel A of 
Figure 2.14 shows the overall tenure distribution of chairmen. On average, their tenure was 
3.249 years between 2002 and 2012. Panel B indicates the tenure distribution of chairmen 
holding the position of party secretary at the same time with 56.36% of the double mandate 
chairmen staying in office for one or two years. The average tenure is 2.559 years; however, 
Panel C indicates that single mandate chairmen have longer tenures. The average tenure is 
3.679 years, which is 1.12 years longer than that of the party secretary, whose tenure is 
more evenly distributed. 
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Education. Double mandate chairmen are better educated than single mandate 
chairmen. Figure 2.15 depicts the distribution of educational attainment over five levels. 
Panel A shows that around 70% of chairmen have at least a college degree or above. Panel 
B indicates that around 94% of double mandate chairmen have at least a college degree or 
above, and more than 72% of them have a master’s or Ph.D. degree. Panel C shows that 
63% of single mandate chairmen have at least a college education or above. These figures 
demonstrate that single mandate chairmen are less educated than double mandate chairmen 
for two possible reasons. First, educational level could signal an individual’s innate ability. 
Party secretaries may be more competent than the nonparty secretaries. The party has 
incentives to select competent leaders for key political positions. During the reform era, 
the standards for party recruitment highlighted the “Four Transformations”: to recruit 
younger, better educated, more vocationally qualified, and revolutionized government 
officials. Officials with strong capacity may have a greater chance to be promoted to party 
leaders. Second, many local leaders earned on-the-job graduate degrees. A considerable 
proportion of them came from party-sponsored schools. Party secretaries have better career 
prospects and stronger incentives to earn graduate degrees and enhance their resumes. 
Meanwhile, the party sponsors adult education to train loyal and promising officials in the 
party-sponsored schools (Li and Walder 2001). Detailed education records of most leaders 
are unavailable, making identifying whether they obtained full-time or part-time degrees 
difficult. Both explanations may coexist in China’s political system. 
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Figure 2.16: Other Characteristics of Chairman in MPC 
Notes: Panel A shows the proportion of female chairmen in MPC. The t-statistic for male is -6.17 and 
indicates that non-party secretary chairmen are less male dominated. Panel B indicates the proportion 
of ethnic (non-Han) chairmen. The t-statistic for ethnicity is 14.78 and shows that non-party secretary 
chairmen is more likely to be ethnic minorities than party secretary chairmen. Panel C shows the 
proportion of chairmen working in their hometown. The t-statistic for home city is 28.62 and shows that 
non-party secre 
 
Gender. Panel A of Figure 2.16 indicates the proportion of female chairpersons in 
local congresses. Only 7% of chairmen are female in the full sample. The percentage is 
even lower for double mandate chairmen. Women constitute 9% of single mandate 
chairmen. The results reveal that women are seriously underrepresented and account for a 
higher proportion among the single mandate chairmen. 
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Ethnicity. Panel B of Figure 2.16 depicts the proportion of ethnic (non-Han) 
chairmen. Ethnic minorities account for 8.49% of the population of mainland China. In the 
full sample, the proportion of ethnic minorities is 16.4%. Ethnic minorities constitute 
23.4% of single mandate chairmen, yet only 5.1% of double mandate chairmen are from 
ethnic minorities. In the ethnic autonomous prefectures, the mayor and chairmen of 
people’s congresses are usually members of the main ethnic minority group, and the party 
secretaries are Han. This pattern explains why the chairmen of local congresses are better 
represented by local ethnic groups, but party secretaries are underrepresented. 
Hometown. Social ties, especially hometown connections, could shape the 
functions of bureaucracies. For instance, auditors find less questionable government funds 
in their hometowns (Chu et al. Forthcoming), and native officials improve hometown 
infrastructures after gaining more power (Do, Nguyen and Tran 2017). In this study, I 
identify whether chairmen of local congresses work in their home cities. Those working in 
their hometowns may have strong family ties and political networks. Panel C of Figure 
2.16 shows the proportion of the chairmen working in their hometowns. Nearly 30% of 
them work in their home cities in the full sample. The percentage reaches 46.2% of single 
mandate chairmen, but only 5.1% of double mandate chairmen work in their hometowns. 
In China, the dominant local party and government leaders are frequently rotated to avoid 
preoccupation with local interests. For instance, 58.81% of prefecture party secretaries 
were transferred between 1999 and 2007 (Landry, Lü and Duan 2018), yet many chairmen 
of local congresses worked in their hometown for their entire political careers. This is more 
evident among single mandate chairmen. 
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Basic Regression Results 
To systematically examine how these individual characteristics shape the dual 
appointment of party and legislative leaders, I conduct a simple binary logistic regression 
in Table 2.1 and add the individual variables noted above in a framework. The dependent 
variable is dual appointment in local congresses. It is a dummy variable and equal to 1 if 
the party secretary in a city holds the chair of the people’s congress in a specific year, 
otherwise 0. Column (1) indicates that age, gender, ethnic, education, and hometown are 
significantly linked to the probability of dual appointment. It implies that younger, male, 
Han, more educated, and nonlocal leaders are more likely to be simultaneously appointed 
as party secretaries and congress chairmen. These results are consistent with the descriptive 
analysis. 
I also test some motivations of dual appointment. First, I use the number of protest 
to proxy local social stability and examine whether stability concerns motivates dual 
appointments. In columns (2) of Table 2.1, the number of protests is positively and 
significantly correlated with the probability of dual appointment at the 1% level. It 
indicates that social stability concerns may enhance party control over the legislatures. The 
party secretaries are more likely to hold the chairmanships of local congresses when cities 
experienced more protests in the previous year. 
Second, I examine whether political competition drives dual appointment. 
Following Lü and Landry (2014), I use the number of counties within each prefecture to 
capture local political competition. Column (2) in Table 1 indicate that county pool size 
has a negative and significant impact on the probability of dual appointment. It reveals that 
more intense political competition within each prefecture can reduce the likelihood of dual 
appointment. The results confirm the political competition motivation. 
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Table 2.1: Dependent variable: Dual appointment 
 
Notes: The analysis employs binary logistic model. The dependent variable is 1 when a city adopted 
dual appointment in year t, otherwise 0. Robust standard errors are clustered at city level. Protest and 
county pool size are lagged one year period. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p< 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
 
Political cycle and ethnic regions may change political turnover and individual 
characteristics. In column (3), I add political cycle and ethnic autonomous prefectures in 
the analysis, the results shows that dual appointment is less likely to be adopted in years 
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with political cycle. 19  Dual appointment has a lower chance to emerge in ethnic 
autonomous prefectures. 
In addition, many city characteristics may shape key independent variables and 
outcome variables. For instance, urbanization may shape political stability (Wallace 2014), 
local education level may shape institutions and the supply of politicians, economic 
development and state capacity may affect institutional choices. To mitigate this concern, 
I control several city covariants including population, fiscal revenue, GDP per capital, 
average education level, and urbanization rate. Most of covariants were collected from 
China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy. 20  Annual education level is not 
available. I use the China 2005 1 % Population Intercensus Survey (the 2005 mini census) 
to calculate average education level in each prefecture. All covariants are controlled, as 
shown in Column (4). The results remain consistent and robust. 
Due to data limitations, I have not tested whether political status and personnel 
control motivations could shape chances of dual appointment. In addition, the basic 
regression results only illustrate possible correlations or patterns. The links between of 
political competition, social unrest and dual appointment are not causal. 
Another question is whether dual appointment reduces the probability of social 
unrest and maintains political stability as expected by the ruling party. In Table 2.2, I test 
the effect of dual appointment on protests. To reduce adverse causality, dual appointment 
is lagged one year period. The results in column (1) show that dual appointment has a 
negative but insignificant impact on social unrest. After adding more covariants, the results 
 
19 The National People's Congress has a five-year term. Over the past two decades, new political cycle 
started in 2003, 2008, 2013, and 2018. Political cycles in local congresses usually begin one year before that 
of the national congress. I conduct a political cycle dummy, 2002, 2007, and 2012 are 1, otherwise 0. 
20 Urbanization rate was collected and calculated from China City Statistical Yearbook and Statistics of City 
and County Demographic in People's Republic of China. 
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are similar. Table 2 provides evidence that dual appointment may not achieve intended 
results. 
Table 2.2: Dual Appointment and Social Unrest 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at city level. Dual appointment is lagged one year period. ∗ 







This study illustrates the dynamic relations between the communist party and 
congresses in China. The strength of ruling party control over local congresses displays 
spatial and temporal variations. In particular, I employ dual appointment of party 
secretaries and chairmen of local congresses as a typical case of ruling party control. I 
hypothesize that dual appointment is adopted to elevate the political status of congresses 
and strengthen personnel and social control. Different from democratic institutions, the 
distribution of power within legislatures is driven by political control from above. 
Empirically, I provide some supporting evidence on parts of arguments. I 
demonstrate that dual appointment is more likely to emerge when prefectures had more 
social unrest in previous year. Dual appointment may be an important power arrangement 
for ruling parties to strengthen control over society. In addition, empirical results show that 
political competition is negatively and significantly linked to dual appointment. It reveals 
that dual appointment is less likely to be adopted in areas with intense interjurisdiction 
competition. The separate appointment of legislative and party leaders may be a tool for 
ruling parties to maintain local elites’ loyalty and incentivize them to manifest competence 
and loyalty. However, due to data limitation, it is still unknown whether the adoption of 
dual appointment is driven by the motivations of personnel control or elevating political 
status of congresses. I leave these issues to future research. 
Furthermore, this study demonstrates some of the limitations of local congresses in 
China. As Manion (2015) shows, Chinese congresses remain amateur assemblies. I 
illustrate the amateurism by indicating that congress leaders tend to be less competent than 
party leaders. Compared with double mandate chairmen, single mandate chairmen are less 
educated, older, close to retirement age, and local born, and chairmen of congresses tend 
to be the last stop of their political career. Due to marginal chance of promotion, they may 
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have weak career incentives and prefer peaceful retirements rather than offending 
embedded local interests. 
The study has some limitations. I use educational attainments of leaders to proxy 
competence. Though the educational attainment is commonly used to proxy competence 
of government officials (e.g., Besley and Reynal-Querol 2011; Dal Bó et al. 2017), it may 
have some noises. In China, many leaders got part-time graduate degrees in party schools 
to decorate their profiles, these degrees were easy to be obtained and may not reflect their 
innate capacity. It is essential to find better measurements in the future. In addition, I only 
compare single mandate chairmen with party-secretary chairmen. Ideally, legislative 




Chapter 3:  Power Concentration and Legislative Politics 
INTRODUCTION 
As evidenced in Chapter 1, the ruling party has incentives to strengthen control 
over legislative institutions to deal with unfavorable results such as social unrest. Dual 
appointment of party and legislative leaders is a typical form of ruling party control, which 
allows ruling party leaders to concurrently hold two power positions. 
The ruling party control over legislatures is not unique to China. The adoption of 
legislatures is costly for autocrats because legislatures do not consistently serve the 
interests of authoritarian rule. In particular, legislatures could serve as a platform for regime 
opponents (Schuler and Malesky 2014). Legislative processes can be quite contentious 
(Tanner 1995), and legislatures run the risk of yielding outcomes counter to the ruler’s 
policy preferences (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). As a result, authoritarian ruling parties 
adopt various strategies to maintain tight party control over legislatures. For instance, 
authoritarian ruling parties control the composition of delegates (Malesky and Schuler 
2010), constrain delegates’ proposals in nonsensitive issues (Truex 2016), and co-opt 
legislative leaders into the top communist party organizations (Nelson and White 1982). 
Ruling parties decide the realm of legislative power and structure agendas in congresses. 
These studies mainly examines how and why ruling parties control legislatures in 
authoritarian regimes. Yet few studies evaluates the political consequences of ruling party 
control on legislative politics. 
To fill this gap, this study identifies a new form of authoritarian party control over 
legislatures and evaluates its political consequences. In particular, I use dual appointment 
of chief party leaders and legislative leaders to capture ruling party control, which allows 
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ruling party leaders directly hold the chairmanships of local congresses. Dual appointment 
can enhance power concentration and ruling-party control. 
I argue that authoritarian ruling parties may confront a trade-off in their attempts to 
tightly control legislatures. The ruling party uses dual appointment to elevate the political 
status of congresses and strengthen ruling party control. However, dual appointment 
impedes bottom-up information from legislators and has no evident impact on the oversight 
of executive power. 
Chinese local congresses provide an illustrative case of party control legislatures. 
China is a one-party state, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a strong grip on 
executive and legislative power. To strengthen party leadership over the local congress, 
local party secretaries serve concurrently as the chairpersons of the local congress. I use 
the subnational variation of the change in power configuration across time and areas to 
capture the dynamics of power concentration. Empirically, I construct a novel dataset of 
legislative activities and leadership information in 333 cities between 2002 and 2012. 
The empirical results demonstrate that power concentration significantly reduces 
the number of policy proposals from legislators. The reduction effect is more salient when 
party leaders have better career prospects. Legislators have more incentives to suppress 
their opinions in congresses when leaders have better career prospects. A placebo test 
confirms that the effect is not driven by leaders’ personalities or leadership styles. 
Moreover, I demonstrate that power concentration has no significant impact on oversights 
of executive power, measured by the misuse of public funds. It suggests that strengthening 
ruling party control is inadequate to enhance the supervision of executive power. I draw a 
consistent conclusion after using two instrument variables to deal with endogeneity 
concerns. 
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This study contributes to the literature on functions of authoritarian legislatures. 
Authoritarian legislatures can serve as an information channel for rulers to collect 
information about the strength of public preferences (Malesky and Schuler 2011; Manion 
2015; Truex 2016). The role of legislatures may be conditional on internal power dynamics. 
A growing number of studies suggests that legislative activities within authoritarian 
regimes exhibit substantial variation across space and time; stakeholders like ruling 
coalitions and the masses could change legislative outcomes (Lü, Liu and Li 2020; Malesky 
and Schuler 2010; Truex 2020). This study demonstrates that power concentration of 
legislative leaders could shape behaviors of legislators, who become less likely to tape local 
knowledge from below. Power arrangements of legislatures, such as dual appointment, 
may dampen the role of information gathering in authoritarian legislatures. 
This study contributes to the literature on ruling party controls in authoritarian 
legislatures. Ruling party control over legislatures is common in both democracies and 
nondemocracies. In democracies, legislators are motivated by reelection concerns (Laver, 
Laver and Shepsle 1996), and the lure of public offices drives the formation of legislative 
parties and coalitions (Cox 2008). However, authoritarian legislatures have distinct 
features regarding ruling party control. They are politically subservient to the ruling party 
or the executive, and the party decides the boundaries of legislative power (Gandhi, Noble 
and Svolik 2020). Legislator’s behaviors are more likely to be constrained by political 
leadership rather than citizens’ preferences. This study evaluates the political consequences 
of strong ruling party control in a single-party regime. The results show that the ruling 
party faces a trade-off when asserting their control in legislatures: tight control may lead 
to serious information problems for ruling parties. 
The study increases our knowledge of the separation of party and state in 
nondemocracies. In democracies, separate powers introduce an additional veto point into 
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the decision-making process and decentralize politics (Gerring, Thacker and Moreno 
2009), while multiple veto players increase checks and enhance credibility (Keefer and 
Stasavage 2003); however, in nondemocracies, the separation of the party and state is 
difficult to achieve, and the ruling party tends to monopolize power. In the early reform 
era in the 1980s, China attempted to promote partial separation of the party from the state, 
which was suspended after 1989. In recent years, CCP has strengthened the role of party 
organizations in various organs of rule (the government, the military, legislatures, and mass 
organizations), emphasizing party leadership. In those organizations, the party leadership 
group and executive power jointly make decisions to guarantee the implementation of party 
lines and policies. Party committees even make final decisions on public issues (Lieberthal 
2004). The party exerts salient influence in the operations of government and other organs 
of rule. This study suggests that strong party control may not achieve intended aims, and 




Subnational authoritarian legislatures usually perform two key functions that 
sustain authoritarian rule: information collecting and oversight of executive power. 
First, authoritarian legislatures facilitate information collection and aggregation for 
policymaking. Authoritarian regimes commonly adopt legislatures to enhance regime 
survival by co-opting elites (Gandhi 2008) and facilitating power-sharing (Svolik 2012). 
In one-party regimes like China, the institutional design of local congresses mainly 
corresponds to the pursuit of legitimation (Manion 2015; McCormick 1990). Regime 
survival is not the main concern for local leaders. Absence of competitive election, local 
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leaders lack accurate information about public discontents and opposition forces. Although 
regular small-scale protests can serve as an efficient information gathering instrument in 
authoritarian regimes (Lorentzen 2013), protests are costly and may escalate into massive 
unrest. Authoritarian regimes also rely on the Internet to collect and filter information 
(King, Pan and Roberts 2013), yet online information may represent only the opinions of 
netizens and be biased, and people may not speak freely on the Internet because of the fear 
of censorship and repression. Social media and other online platforms have only emerged 
in recent years. By contrast, local legislatures offer a formal and peaceful channel to 
identify public dissatisfaction before an uprising occurs (Cho2008) and reveal information 
about the strength of public preferences (Malesky and Schuler 2011; Manion 2015; Truex 
2016). 
Another role of local legislatures is to monitor executive power. Since many 
authoritarian regimes rely on domestic investment to maintain economic growth and 
sustain their rule, they are incentivized to constrain their own power to attract more 
investments (Wright 2008). Yet they are insufficient to credibly commit to refraining from 
exploitative behaviors. The presence of legislatures could place potentially restrictions on 
local executive power and add credibility to power constraints, and reduce expropriation 
risks (Jensen, Malesky and Weymouth 2014; Wilson and Wright 2017). The literature 
demonstrates that local legislatures increasingly enhance their oversight of the workings of 
government in authoritarian regimes like China (Cho 2002; Manion 2015). Though their 
supervision of government is limited, local legislatures provide a plausible channel to 
constrain the executive power. 
How does power concentration shape the functions of authoritarian legislatures? I 
illustrate that authoritarian ruling parties exert tight control of legislatures to avoid 
unfavorable results and elevate the political status of legislatures in oversights of executive 
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power, yet they confront a trade-off: upward information flow from legislators may be 
reduced, and tight ruling party control may have limited consequences on legislative 
oversight of executive power. The next section explains my theoretical framework in detail. 
Power Concentration and Upward Information 
In this section, I illustrate the ways through which the concentration of power 
shapes legislators’ incentives and behaviors. The dual appointment of party and legislative 
leaders may make legislators less likely to submit policy proposals and transmit local 
knowledge to leaders. 
Authoritarian regimes face a “dictator’s dilemma” on information collection. 
Dictators are difficult to have a credible commitment to not punishing those who would 
bring them bad news; the more repressive institutions suppress dissent and criticism, the 
less dictators are aware of their real support (Wintrobe 2000, 335). Legislative institutions 
could partially solve this problem by providing an institutional channel for legislators to 
safely provide suggestions and criticisms without threatening political stability (Gandhi 
2008).  
However, strengthened coercive power may mitigate the informational function of 
authoritarian legislatures. In general, scholars demonstrate that the monopoly of legitimate 
coercion may undermine the provision of information from below (Hooghe, Marks and 
Marks 2001; Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996), dominant political power may breed 
political reticence (Shen and Truex Forthcoming), and politically focal times and locations 
may encourage individuals to engage in severe political self-censorship (Chang and 
Manion 2021). Nondemocracies confront a trade-off between strong political control and 
bureaucratic incentives: under strong political control, lower-tier bureaucrats have weak 
incentives to provide necessary information to higher level officials (Egorov, Guriev and 
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Sonin 2009). Strong political control may lower the quality of bottom-up information 
provision by making subordinate political actors less willing to voice their preferences and 
opinions. 
In authoritarian legislatures, legislators also confront strong coercive power from 
ruling parties. They are seldom autonomous from executive power and ruling parties, and 
are reluctant to represent constituency interests. In China’s contexts, legislators may 
represent citizens and express their grievances, but only “within bounds” (Truex 2016). 
Most legislators are selected from government officials, economic elites, and professionals 
(Manion 2015; O’brien 1990; Truex 2020), who are motivated by career promotions, 
business interests, and legal protection rather than representation (Blaydes 2010; Gandhi, 
Noble and Svolik 2020; Malesky and Schuler 2011).21  Specifically, the career prospects 
of government bureaucrats in legislatures are controlled by local party organizations; 
economic elites seek legislative positions to gain economic returns and secure their 
property rights (Hou 2019; Truex 2014); most professionals like professors and doctors 
work in public institutions and are restrained from expressing their personal views. In 
general, party-nominated legislators are less likely to submit policy bills or suggestions 
than legislators nominated through other channels in Chinese local congresses (Huang and 
Chen 2015). These legislators may be cautious about criticism, suggestions, and 
oversights.22 They may have concerns that policy proposals or criticisms may offend party 
leaders and incur potential negative consequences on their career developments. 
 
21 In terms of legal protection, one case is the Law on Congress Delegates in China, which indicates that 
legislators at county level or above cannot be arrested without the approval of local congresses. 
22 Detailed background information of municipal legislators is not publicly available in most cities. One 
exception is a city (Jiayuguan) in western China. For example, the city yearbook in 2007 disclosed the full 
name lists and demographics of legislators. Among its 174 legislators, 88% of them were communist party 
members, about 50% of legislators came from government and party organizations, 40% were leaders or 
employees of state-owned enterprises (SOE), and only 6.3% legislators worked in private sectors or small 
business. The composition of legislators implies that the party plays a dominant role in the career 
advancements and business interests for most legislators.  
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Dual appointment may weaken legislators’ incentives to submit policy proposals 
and tap local knowledge. In China’s political system, party secretaries are top party chiefs 
and have great control over personnel management and promotion as well as influence in 
the private sector. The joint appointment of local party and legislative power strengthens 
the political power of party secretaries and allows them to intervene in legislative politics. 
They directly control the nomination and approval of personnel appointments in all 
procedures. On paper, all appointments of local government leaders should be approved by 
the local congress, while the party standing committee selects and nominates these 
candidates and party secretaries have a final saying on promotions. 
Legislators rely on party secretaries to further their career development, to gain 
political support, to obtain government funding, and to secure their property rights. After 
perceiving the rising political dominance of party secretaries, legislators fear potential 
punishment when they express criticism. They have more incentives to please rather than 
offend the dominant leader. As a result, these legislators may hide their real views, and 
become less likely to reflect local grievances and engage in legislative supervisions. They 
may be restrained from taping local information for party leaders. 
Power Concentration and Legislative Oversight 
In this section, I hypothesize how power concentration shapes legislative oversight. 
I argue that power concentration may be limited to improve legislative oversight. Though 
the dual appointment of party and legislative leaders may empower congresses and elevate 
congresses’ authority in the oversight of governments, dual appointment may facilitate 
personalization of power and weaken power constraints of party leaders. As a result, dual 
appointment may be inadequate to improve legislative oversight. 
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One key function of congresses is oversight of executive power. In China, local 
congresses conduct oversight of government, the courts, and the procuracy. The oversight 
of executive power has been rising since 1990 and has become the most important work 
for congresses below the provincial level (Cho 2008). Delegates conduct routine 
inspections to check whether unlawful fees have been abrogated, property rights enforced, 
and pollution controlled (Cho 2008; Xia 2007). Local officials are summoned in congresses 
to explain their work. Delegates examine government reports in annual conferences of 
congresses and conduct budget review. 
However, the oversight function of local congresses are weak in China. Delegates 
usually meet once per year in annual conferences, which only lasts several days and there 
many items on the agenda. They may have insufficient time to review budgetary 
arrangements. It is rare for delegates to publicly criticize government officials. Most 
delegates are not professional legislators or economic experts and lack the expertise to 
interpret the technical contents of budget reports. In addition, by the time annual 
conferences take place, the fiscal year has already begun, and the budget has been partially 
implemented by the government (Cabestan 2006). Extra-budgetary funds such as land 
revenue are important sources of government revenue. Yet extra-budgetary funds are not 
formally included in the local budget reports. The legislative oversight of budget may be 
restricted. 
The dual appointment may have divergent effects on legislative oversight. On the 
positive side, dual appointment may strengthen legislative oversight by elevating the 
political status of congresses. As discussed in last chapter, in China’s political system, the 
political status of local congressional chairmen matters for legislative oversight. Local 
congresses are politically weak in the political system. The political status within the party 
of mayors who concurrently hold the post of vice party secretary is just below that of the 
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party secretaries. Both mayors and executive vice mayors occupy two positions in the 
standing committee of the communist party, whose members are the most powerful leaders 
and control massive amount of resources at the local level. Yet single mandate chairmen 
are not members of the party standing committee and have limited authority and resources 
to monitor governments. When local congresses stand up to governments during the 
exercise of their oversight authority, they need powerful backers and routinely seek support 
from local party committees (O’Brien 2009). Dual appointment elevates the political status 
of congresses and allows local congresses to have more authority and resources to monitor 
governments. 
On the negative side, the power concentration of party secretaries may offset the 
strengthened legislative oversight. Power concentration increases the relative power of 
leaders in inner political cycles and is usually linked to the personalization of power 
(Geddes et al. 2018). Dual appointment enables party secretaries to control local ruling 
parties and congresses simultaneously. They may become more influential and powerful 
in the appointment of state officials, budgetary allocation, and lawmaking, they face, in 
other words, less constraints. Compared with single mandate chairmen of congresses, party 
secretaries have stronger career concerns. Career incentives can motivate party secretaries 
to promote urban spatial expansion and sell more lands (Wang, Zhang and Zhou 2020), 
which may fuel corruption (Chen and Kung 2016). Party leaders can use more public funds 
in image building or “political achievement” project to signal competence. As a result, dual 
appointment may weaken power constraints of party leaders, and enable them to have 
stronger control over the ruling party and congresses. Without effective power constraints 
may fuel corruption. 
In sum, legislative oversight is inherently weak in authoritarian legislatures. Dual 
appointment may elevate political status of congresses and empower oversight of executive 
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power. Yet dual appointment promotes personalization of power and undermines power 
constraints of party leaders, which may undo the positive side of dual appointment. As a 
result, dual appointment may have no evident consequence on legislative oversight. 
BACKGROUND 
The China case offers a valuable opportunity to examine how the ruling party 
manipulates legislative institutions and whether party control of legislatures shapes 
authoritarian politics. 
In China’s single-party system, the party exercises strong control of legislatures. 
For instance, at the national level CCP directly controls about 70% to 75% of the seats in 
the National People’s Congress (NPC); “democratic parties” under the control of the CCP 
and unaffiliated deputies hold the remaining seats (Manion 2015; O’brien 1990; Truex 
2020). At the local level party control is the top priority for the operation of the local 
congress. The party selectively mobilizes votes for preferred candidates while strategically 
manipulating electoral rules (Wang 2017), yet, local congresses supervise governments, 
the courts, and the procuracies more actively than the NPC (Cho 2008; Xia 2007). The 
performance and operation of local congressional legislators exhibit considerable regional 
variation (Chen 2020). In sum, the power constraints of local legislatures may be 
heterogeneous across space and time, and conditional on compositions of legislators. 
To strengthen the party’s leadership of local congress, local party secretaries serve 
concurrently as the chairpersons of the local congress. At the provincial level, seven of 33 
provincial party secretaries served as congressional chairs in 1998, and this number 
increased to 21 in 2003 (Almén 2013). At the prefecture level, 38.15% of chairmen were 
held by party secretaries between 2002 and 2012. 
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The dual appointment of party secretaries and chairmen of congresses is a typical 
form of power concentration. In the reform era, Deng Xiaoping pointed out that it is not 
proper to have an over-concentration of power, since it hinders the recognition of collective 
wisdom, and leads to arbitrary rule (Deng 1994). When party secretaries serve as chairs of 
local congresses, they simultaneously acquire executive, party, and legislative power, 
centralizing political authority in the hands of top party chiefs. They may have more power 
in cadre management, budget allocation, and policy agenda setting. Local legislatures may 
be less likely to constrain power. Moreover, information collecting is a crucial function of 
local congresses, which in China operate in an institutional context of executive-led 
governance so they can tap local knowledge and information for party and government 
agents (Manion 2015). Representatives of the local congress may hesitate to express their 
criticisms and policy preferences when the party exerts strong control of legislatures. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Data and Variable 
In this study, I collect biographic data of chairmen in local congresses and 
legislative activities in roughly 300 cities between 2002 and 2012. 23  Biographic 
information of chairmen was obtained from various sources such as government websites, 
media reports, local gazetteers, and the communist party organizational materials I identify 
legislative activities from each city’s yearbook, which contained chapters on local 
congresses in the previous year. The last chapter introduces the data collection processes 
in detail. 
 
23 Some prefectures had no yearbooks in the early periods. The data exclude all 7 prefectures of Tibet, where 
most prefectures didn't publish yearbooks until 2012 and many leaders' information is publicly unavailable 
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Power concentration. The key independent variable in this study is power 
concentration. I use the dual appointment of the city party secretary and the local 
congressional chairman to capture power concentration. From 2002 to 2012, Chinese cities 
experienced waves of institutional change. In some cities, the party secretary 
simultaneously held the chair of the local congress. In the remaining cities, the two 
positions were occupied by different ruling elites. The change in power configurations was 
usually initiated by provincial governments, and cities in a province gradually adopted the 
policy. The power concentration dummy is equal to 1 when a city’s party secretary holds 
the chairman of the local congress at year t, otherwise 0. I collect name information of 
party secretaries and chairmen of congresses from provincial yearbooks. In the year with 
political turnover, party and legislative leaders are those who stayed in the positions for 
more than 6 months. 
Policy Proposals. To identify the informational role of legislatures, I use the total 
number of policy bills, suggestions, and criticisms from legislators. The majority were 
submitted at the annual conference of the local congress. Each city’s yearbook contains a 
section to summarize legislative activities in the previous year. Most city yearbooks report 
the total number of policy bills, suggestions, and criticisms submitted by legislators. The 
size of the local congress may matter for the number of policy bills. To mitigate this 
concern, I use the number of policy bills divided by the number of legislators attending 
annual conferences as an alternative measurement. On average, legislators submitted 171 
policy bills, suggestions, and criticisms. 
There are two types of policy proposals from legislators. One is the proposal (yi 
an). It is more formal and has a higher threshold for collective action, which needs ten or 
more legislators’ signatories; congressional leaders control the agenda and can reject the 
proposals (Manion 2014). The other type is criticism, suggestions, and comment (piping, 
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jianyi, yijian). This type has a lower threshold and can be submitted individually, and both 
during and after the annual congresses. Most yearbooks report the total number of 
proposals, criticism, suggestions, and comments together. When legislators submit a 
collective proposal and get rejected by legislative leaders, the proposal would be 
transformed as one policy suggestion, criticism, or comment. Moreover, the number of 
proposals only accounts for a small proportion of policy bills from legislators. Most 
legislators submit comments, suggestions, or criticism. So the total number of proposals, 
comments, suggestions, and criticisms mainly reflects the supply side of information flow 
from legislators. In this study, I use policy proposals to indicate both collective proposals 
and comments, suggestions, and criticisms. 
Legislative oversight. Another outcome variable is legislative monitoring. I use 
accounts of suspicious expenditures uncovered by auditors to capture the strength of 
legislative oversight. In China’s government audit system, the audit department of 
prefectures is authorized to report to the provincial audit department as well as reporting 
to the prefecture government. Local chief audit leaders are chosen by the local party 
standing committees, and provincial audit office has the power to audit city governments 
(Chu et al. Forthcoming). The audit office at prefecture-level has partial autonomy to 
supervise local fiscal expenditures. Local party secretaries can exert influences on 
government audit through personnel appointments of chief audit officers. 
Scholars widely use the variable and similar data sources to identify government 
monitoring and the misuse of public funds. They demonstrate that flattening government 
structures weakens monitoring of local leaders and increases the amount of misused public 
funds (Bo, Wu and Zhong 2020), and auditors find less questionable government funds in 
their hometowns (Bo, Wu and Zhong 2020). These studies show that high amounts of 
suspicious funds is linked to weak oversight. Similar to above studies, I collected data from 
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China Audit Yearbooks between 2003 and 2013, which covered the suspicious 
expenditures in the previous years. 
Individual controls. Despite the main variables, I control a series of covariants. 
Chairmen’s attributes may shape the power concentration and outcome variables. I control 
for chairmen’s age, tenure, gender, ethnicity, education, and home city. Compared with 
single mandate chairmen, double mandate chairmen are younger, male and Han dominated, 
have a shorter tenure, are better educated, and are less likely to work in their hometowns. 
City controls. A city’s social and economic indicators may shape legislative 
activities. For instance, developed areas may have a higher quality of political institutions 
and a fiscal capacity that is linked to the quality of government, while populous cities may 
have more social problems. City indicators including population, fiscal revenue, GDP per 
capita are thus included in the analysis. 
The political cycle may shape legislative activities and leaders’ career paths. More 
local officials may be appointed or removed, and political turnover are more frequently at 
the new round of political cycles in local congresses. The National People’s Congress has 
a five-year term. Over the past two decades, new political cycle started in 2003, 2008, 
2013, and 2018. 
Legislators at lower levels of congresses are responsible for electing delegate at 
higher levels. For instance, municipal legislators elect provincial delegates, while 
provincial delegates elect national delegates. Political cycles in local congresses usually 
begin one year before that of the national congress. So I conduct a political cycle dummy, 
2002, 2007, and 2012 are 1, otherwise 0. 
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Empirical Setting 
I employ the two-way fixed effects model to test the main hypotheses. The 
following model is the main specification: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 (1) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡t is the outcome variable for city i in year t; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 is the dual 
appointment dummy, which captures whether a party secretary in city i holds the 
chairperson of people’s congress in year t; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a set of city covariants including GDP 
per capita, fiscal revenue, population, and political cycle. 𝐼𝑖𝑡 is a vector of chairmen’s 
individual characteristics including age, gender, tenure, ethnicity, education, and home 
city. 𝛾𝑖 captures city fixed effects,  𝛿𝑡 is the time-specific effect of year t. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at prefecture level. 
First, I test the overall effects of power concentration on policy proposals. If 𝛽1 is 
significantly positive, we may predict that the demands of party secretaries on information 
outweigh the concerns of legislators, and power concentration actually enhances the 
functions of legislatures. By contrast, if 𝛽1 is significantly negative, we may draw the 
conclusion that legislators are still less likely to tap local information and oversee 
governments even though party leaders encourage them to do so. 
To further identify legislators’ motivations, I identify chairmen’s career prospect. 
Not all party leaders have the same likelihood of promotion. Due to age restrictions for 
promotions, younger leaders gain an advantage in career advancements (Kou and Tsai 
2014; Landry, Lü and Duan 2018). City party and government leaders are ineligible for 
promotion after age 57. In the sample, the average age of double mandate chairmen is 
51.79. Between 1994 and 2011, city party secretaries and mayors had an average age of 
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50.5 and a median age of 51 (Xi, Yao and Zhang 2018). If a city official is 50 or below, 
she or he could be younger than more than half of city leaders and gain competitive 
advantage. I thus use whether a party secretary is 50 or younger to capture their career 
prospects. In the following model, I interact power concentration with chairmen’s age 
dummy. 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 × 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼3𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 (2) 
 
where 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a dummy variable and equal to 1 if chairmen of congresses are 50 or 
younger. The coefficient 𝛼1 captures the interaction effect of power concentration and 
age. 
MAIN RESULTS 
Power Concentration and Policy Proposals 
I investigate whether power concentration could reduce bottom-up information 
flow from legislators. Table 3.1 shows the estimated results. I use the total number of 
proposal (log) as the outcome variable. In column (1), I present baseline results from the 
specification that only include the key independent variable, along with city and year fixed 
effects. The results show that power concentration has a negative and significant effect on 
the total number of proposals, suggestions, and criticisms at 1% level. After adding 
chairmen’s individual characteristics in column (2), the results are similar and significant 
at 1% level. In column (3), both individual and city characteristics are included in the 
analysis. The estimated coefficient of power concentration is -0.124 and significant at 1% 
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level, demonstrating that power concentration reduces 12.4% of policy proposals submitted 
by legislators. 
One concern is that the size of delegates matters for the submission of policy 
proposals. To deal with the concern, I use the number of proposals divided by the number 
of legislators attending the annual conference as an alternative dependent variable, when 
most proposals were submitted by legislators. Columns (4) to (6) in Table 3.1 present 
estimated results. The results are consistent and confirm that legislators tend to submit 
fewer proposals when party secretaries directly control the congresses. 
Table 3.1: Power concentration and legislators’ policy proposal 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at prefecture level. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p< 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
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Moreover, I conduct several robustness checks. First, Table B1 in Appendix 
demonstrates the estimated results using the number of proposals and proposal per capita 
as outcome variables. The results are consistent and confirm that dual appointments 
significantly reduce the willingness of legislators to submit policy proposals, as shown in 
column (3). In the year of political turnover, new party secretaries may not attend annual 
conferences when delegates submit most of policy proposals. They may not directly exert 
influences on delegates. I use one-year lagged power concentration to mitigate this 
concern. In Table B2, the results show that one-year lagged power concentration has a 
negative and significant impact on both proposals and proposal per capita. The magnitudes 
of coefficients are smaller than those in Table 3.1. 
Moreover, dual appointment is less likely to be adopted in ethnic autonomous 
prefectures and vice provincial cities. In ethnic autonomous prefectures, the posts of party 
secretaries are normally held by Han, while the chairmen of congresses are ethnic 
minorities. The divergent institutions in ethnic autonomous prefectures may alter the 
results. Vice provincial cities are usually capital city of provinces, have unique political 
status, and obtain more political and fiscal resources.24 They may not be comparable with 
other cities, where both party secretaries and chairmen of congresses are at the Bureau 
Director rank. To mitigate these concerns, all ethnic autonomous prefectures are removed 
in the analysis in Table B3. The results remain consistent and robust, as shown in columns 
(1) to (6). Table B4 presents the estimated results after excluding vice provincial cities in 
the analysis. Columns (1) to (6) indicates that power concentration has a positive and 
 
24 There are 15 vice-provincial cities in China, most of them are capitals of the provinces. They include 
Changchun, Chengdu, Dalian, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Harbin, Ji'nan, Nanjing, Ningbo, Qingdao, Shenyang, 
Shenzhen, Wuhan, Xi'an, and Xiamen. In these cities, the party secretaries and chairmen of people's congress 
are at the rank of deputy minister. 
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significant impact on both number of proposals and proposal per capita at 5% or 1% level. 
The results are consistent with those in Table 1. 
To further examine the consequences of power concentration, I take the career 
prospects of party secretaries into consideration. Career prospects refer to officials’ future 
promotion prospects. The party tends to advance younger officials and restrict the 
promotion of ageing officials (Kou and Tsai 2014). If party secretaries are much younger 
than colleagues in equivalent positions, they will gain a great advantage in the race for 
promotion. An observable and easy-to-interpret indicator of career prospect is age. Party 
secretaries younger than 50 have a larger chance of being promoted. I thus use whether a 
party secretary is 50 or younger to capture career prospects. 
Legislators can perceive the career prospects of party secretaries and have 
incentives to build patronage ties with them. In China’s political system, patronage ties 
between patrons and clients are usually built through work ties in the same areas (Jia, 
Kudamatsu and Seim 2015). When a patron has better career prospects, the client could 
have a bigger chance of be continuously promoted. If party secretaries are expected to 
move to higher positions, they may bring more opportunities of career advancements for 
local officials in the same city. Many legislators are local officials. After perceiving better 
career prospects of legislative leaders, they may be actively to cater to those leaders rather 
than offend them. As a result, legislators may be less likely to submit policy suggestions, 
criticisms, and comments when double mandate chairmen have better career prospects. 
Table 3.2 shows how the impact of power concentration on policy proposals may 
be conditional on leaders’ career prospects. Columns (1) and (3) indicates that the 
interaction term of power concentration and age 50 or younger is negative and significant. 
Columns (4) to (6) present similar results using proposals per capita as an alternative 
measurement.  
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Table 3.2: Power concentration, career prospect and legislators’ policy proposal 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at prefecture level. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p< 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
 
The results imply that legislators are less likely to submit proposals when party 
secretaries control congresses and have a better career prospect. As discussed above, a large 
proportion of legislators are local officials in government, SOEs, and party organs. Party 
secretaries have a large say in their career advancements. When party secretaries are 
younger, they gain an advantage in political competition and have better chance of being 
promoted. Legislators, especially legislators working in party and governments, may be 
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more reluctant to propose policy suggestions, comments, or even criticisms. Thus, they are 
less likely to submit policy proposals in congresses. 
Furthermore, party secretaries’ personalities rather than positions could shape the 
behaviors of legislators. For instance, more than half of party leaders in China appear to 
have an autocratic leadership style, prefering effective execution  and concentrated 
decision-making and (Jiang and Luo Forthcoming). It is possible that double mandate 
chairmen are more assertive than single mandate chairmen and less unwilling to hear 
different views. The reduction effect of dual appointment may be driven by their 
personalities rather than power concentration. However, leaders’ personalities and 
leadership styles are unobservable. 
To deal with the issue, I conducted a placebo test using retired party secretaries. As 
shown above, 4.5% of chairmen are retired party secretaries in the sample. Those retired 
party secretaries usually work as chairmen where they were party secretaries. Holding the 
chairperson of congresses allows them to bypass the age limits and stay in the political 
arena for longer. For instance, Liu Yupu was the party secretary and chairman of congress 
in Shenzhen between 2008 and 2010. After retiring from the position of party secretary in 
April 2010, he continued to hold the congressional chairmanship until 2013. In this 
scenario, the power concentration variable in Shenzhen was coded as 1 in 2008 and 2009, 
and 0 between 2010 and 2012. Personalities and leadership styles are usually stable. I thus 
use the retired double mandate chairmen as a placebo test to isolate the effect of power 
concentration. 
In Table 3.3, I examine whether retired double mandate chairmen exhibit similar 
effects as current double mandate chairmen. To conduct the placebo test, I restrict the 
sample to all single mandate chairmen in local congresses, which excludes current double 
mandate chairmen. The results in columns (1) to (3) show that retired double mandate 
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chairmen have no significant effect on the total number of proposals. Compared with other 
single mandate chairmen, they have no salient consequences on legislators’ submission of 
policy proposals. Columns (4) to (6) confirm that the power concentration effect disappears 
when party secretaries leave their position as chief party leaders. The results imply that the 
consequences of power concentration may not be driven by party leaders’ personalities or 
leadership styles. 
Table 3.3: Placebo Test: Retired Party Secretaries 
 
 
Notes: The analysis uses the non-party secretary sample. Robust standard errors are clustered at 
prefecture level. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p< 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
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In sum, these findings confirm that the power concentration of party secretaries 
could reduce the bottom-up information flow from legislators. The effect is more salient 
when party secretaries are younger and have better career prospect. Legislators are less 
willing to express their suggestions, comments, and criticisms in congresses when 
legislative leaders are powerful. A placebo test rules out the alternative explanation that 
leaders’ personality or leadership style drives the results. The main results are also 
consistent and robust after taking ethnic autonomous prefectures and vice provincial cities 
into consideration. 
 
Power Concentration and Personnel Appointment 
In this subsection, I test whether dual appointment increases party secretaries’ 
influence on personnel appointments. One key function of local congresses is to appoint or 
remove state officials. Standing committees of congresses are accountable for electing state 
officials after the closure of annual conferences. In the last chapter, I indicated that double 
mandate chairmen could be involved in the whole procedures of cadre appointment and 
have a tight control over personnel affairs. The total number of prefectural level state 
officials is stable due to staffing restrictions (bianzhi), especially for senior state officials. 
It is unlikely that party leaders will appoint or remove a large number of state officials 
every year. The influence of double mandate chairmen may vary across tenure years. In 
the sample, 56.36% of the party-secretary chairmen stay in office for one or two years, the 
average tenure of party secretary chairmen is 2.559. The full term of chairmen in 





Table 3.4: Power concentration on the number of appointed officials in MPC 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at prefecture level. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p< 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
 
In Table 3.4, I estimate how power concentration shapes personnel appointments 
by tenure years. The outcome variable is the number of appointment and removal of state 
officials in each tenure year. Column (1) shows that power concentration has a positive but 
insignificant effect on the appointment or removal of officials in their first year of tenure, 
when double mandate chairmen may not be involved in all elections of state officials, and 
they need time to consolidate power. For a large number of party secretaries, engagement 
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in personnel appointments in congresses begins in the second year of their tenure. They 
may have greater power and become more influential in this year. Column (2) confirms 
that power concentration has a positive and significant effect on the appointment and 
removal of state officials at 5% level. The estimated coefficient is 15.116, which reveals 
that party secretaries appoint or remove about 15 more state officials in local congresses. 
The estimated coefficient becomes negative and insignificant in column (3), which 
indicates that local congresses tend to appoint or remove smaller numbers of officials after 
a large scale personnel changes in the previous year. Columns (4) and (5) show that power 
concentration has no evident impact on the appointment or removal of state officials in the 
fourth or fifth year of tenure. To facilitate interpretation, I plot the estimated coefficients 
of power concentration in Figure 3.1. It shows that double mandate chairmen appoint or 
removal significantly more state officials in their second year of office. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Power Concentration and Appointment of Officials across Tenure Year 
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The above results provide evidence that double mandate chairmen are influential in 
the appointment and removal of state officials in congresses, especially in the second year 
of their tenure. It may take time for new double mandate chairmen to consolidate power in 
the first year of office, and they may not be involved in all conferences and sessions of 
local congresses in the first year. In the second year, they may have stronger control over 
cadre appointments and become more likely to appoint officials and build their patronage 
networks. The average tenure of double mandate chairmen is less than 3 years. Party 
leaders avoid appointing officials before leaving office, which may bring them unexpected 
troubles and problems.25  For instance, if they promoted officials before leaving office, 
they cannot effectively control these newly appointed officials, whose misbehaviours 
would damage their reputations or career after they leave office. In addition, this action 
would be blamed by incoming leaders. 
In this subsection, I demonstrate that party secretaries have stronger control over 
the appointment of state officials when they directly hold the chairmanship of congresses. 
It partly explains why legislators, especially those working in government and party 
organizations, may have concerns about submitting proposals in congresses, which may 
exert negative consequences on their career advancements. 
Power Concentration and Legislative Oversight 
In this section, I examine whether power concentration could strengthen legislative 
oversights of governments. I use suspicious fiscal expenditures to capture legislative 
oversight of governments. If the hypothesis is correct, we may expect that the estimated 
coefficient of power concentration is negative and significant. 
 
25 It was revealed by a government official in a phone interview conducted in Feb 9, 2021. 
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Table 3.5 shows the estimated results. Columns (1) indicates that power 
concentration has a negative but insignificant effect on the total amount of suspicious 
expenditures between 2002 and 2012. After adding individual and city controls, the 
estimated coefficients of power concentration remain insignificant. Columns (4)-(6) show 
that power concentration has no significant impact on suspicious expenditure per capita. 
These results demonstrate that power concentration fails to improve supervision of public 
funds. 
Table 3.5: Power concentration and suspicious expenditures (2002-2012) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at prefecture level. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p< 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
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One concern is the quality of data. Only after 2006, the National Audit Office 
adopted consistent reporting standards of suspicious expenditures (Chu et al. 
Forthcoming). To reduce the concern, I restrict the analysis between 2006 and 2012. Table 
B5 in Appendix shows estimation results using suspicious expenditure data between 2006 
and 2012. Columns (1) shows that power concentration has a negative and significant effect 
on suspicious expenditure at 10% level. After all controls in column (3), the results are 
consistent at significant at 10% level. Columns (4)-(6) present similar results using 
suspicious expenditure per capita as the outcome variable. 
After employing better quality data, the estimated results show that power 
concentration has significant reduction effect on suspicious expenditure at 10% level. 
However, the effect of power concentration is not causal. I will examine the causal effect 
of power concentration in next section. 
CAUSAL IDENTIFICATION 
One concern is the endogeneity of power concentration. Though I have controlled 
many individual characteristics and city indicators, some unobserved factors may still 
shape power concentration and outcome variables at the same time. For instance, leaders’ 
political connections and personalities may be linked to their career paths and shape the 
operation of local congresses. To mitigate this concern, I use the instrumental variable 
approach. 
In China, local city leaders compete against each other for career advancements. 
This tournament competition usually exists among local officials at the same level within 
the same province (Yu, Zhou and Zhu 2016). Leaders within the same administrative 
jurisdictions have incentives to show loyalty and competence to their principals (Lü and 
Landry 2014). In particular, when local leaders perceive more competition pressures from 
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other cities at the same province, they may be more likely to implement specific policies 
and comply with instructions from above. 
The change of dual appoint is usually promoted by provincial governments, and 
gradually diffused to cities. Since 2009, prefectures in provinces such as Hubei, Fujian, 
Jiangxi, Shaanxi, Gansu, and Inner Mongolia gradually adopted the separation of party 
secretaries and congressional chairmen. For instance, in 2009, Hubei province issued a 
party document to require that the chairmanship of municipal congresses be held by a 
separate leader (other than the party secretary). This change in power configuration was 
gradually diffused to cities within the same province. 
Thus, I use the spatial variation of dual appointment in neighboring cities in 
previous year as the instrument variable. To reduce the reverse casualty concern, dual 
appointment in neighboring cities in previous year (t− 1) is employed to instrument dual 
appointment in a prefecture in year t. 
It is a reasonable instrument variable for several reasons. First, city’s policy change 
may be closely related to policies in neighboring cities. Due to regional political 
competition within same provinces, neighboring cities’ adoption of policies may exert 
competing pressures and motivate a city to adopt similar policies. Second, neighboring 
cities’ legislative leadership change may not affect a city’s legislative activities through 
any other channels. Moreover, institutions or policy changes in neighboring areas are 
widely used as instrument variables. For instance, Acemoglu et al. (2019) use regional 
waves in transition to and away from democracy as an instrument variable of democracy, 
Büthe and Milner (2008) employs neighboring countries’ membership in international 
trade agreements to instrument a country’s participation in these agreements. 
I construct two instrument variables to deal with the endogeneity concern of power 
concentration. First, I use a dummy variable to capture whether neighboring cities of 
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prefecture i adopted dual appointment in previous year. Neighboring cities refer to 
prefectures sharing same geographic borders within the same provinces.  I use GIS data 
to identify neighboring cities in the same provinces for all cities. The number of 
neighboring cities varies from 1 to 8. The instrument variable is equal to 1 when at least 
one neighboring prefecture adopted dual appointment in previous year, otherwise 0. 
I construct another instrument for a robustness check. The dichotomous instrument 
variable above may be limited to capture spatial variations in neighboring cities. I thus use 
the proportion of neighboring cities in the same province that adopted dual appointment to 









where i refers to prefecture i, p indicates the province in which the prefecture i is located, 
and t denotes year. 𝑁𝑖𝑝 is the total number of neighboring prefectures of i in province p. 
𝐷𝑗𝑝𝑡−1captures whether a neighboring prefecture j in province p adopted dual appointment 
in the previous year (t − 1); it equals 1 with the dual appointment, otherwise 0. This IV 
captures the proportion of neighboring prefectures in the same provinces that adopt dual 
appointment in previous year. It is a continuous variable and ranges from 0 to 1. 
The instrument variable may meet the key assumptions of a valid instrument 
variable. The adoption of dual appointment in neighboring cities may be positively 
correlated with the probability of adopting dual appointment in city i; however, the 
adoption of dual appointment in other cities in the same province may be unlikely to 
directly affect legislative activities in city i. The only channel through which the instrument 
variable affects outcome variables is through the dual appointment in prefecture i. 
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Table 3.6: Instrument Variable I: Power concentration and legislators’ policy proposal  
 
Notes: The analysis uses instrumental variables and two-stage least squares for panel-data models. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at prefecture level. Individual controls include age, gender, ethnic, 
education, and home city. City controls include population (logged), fiscal revenue(logged), GDP per 
capita (logged), and political cycle. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p< 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
 
To determine whether the two instrumental variables meet the exclusion restriction 
assumption, i.e., the only channel though which instrument variables affect outcome 
variable is the endogenous variable (power concentration), I conduct a test. Table B6 in 
Appendix presents the estimated results. In Panel A, the results show that the instrument 
variable, neighboring concentration dummy, has a positive and significant impact on power 
concentration, and has no significant influence on covariants such as social unrest, political 
competition, population, fiscal revenue, and GDP per capita. This indicates that the 
instrument variable may satisfy the exclusion restriction condition. In Panel B, the results 
demonstrate that the second instrument variable, neighboring concentration proportion, is 
significantly correlated with power concentration at 1% level, and has no significant 
consequence on other covariants. The only exception is that the instrument variable is 
linked to population at 10% level. As shown in Table 3.1, population has no significant 
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effect on policy proposal. Population is also controlled in the analysis. This may not be a 
big concern. 
 
Table 3.7: Instrument Variable II: Power concentration and legislators’ policy proposal 
 
Notes: The analysis uses instrumental variables and two-stage least squares for panel-data models. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at prefecture level. Individual controls include age, gender, ethnic, 
education, and home city. City controls include population (logged), fiscal revenue(logged), GDP per 
capita (logged), and political cycle. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p< 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
 
I evaluate the causal effect of power concentration on policy proposals. I employ 
instrumental variables and two-stage least squares for panel-data models as the main 
specification. Table 3.6 presents the estimated results using the first instrument variable. 
In panel B, the first stage results indicate that neighboring dual appointment dummy in t − 
1 is positively and significantly correlated to the dual appointment across all specifications. 
It suggests that a city may be more likely to adopt dual appointment when at least one 
neighboring city had the dual appointment. The relevance assumption of IV can be 
satisfied. Wald F statistics are larger than 10 from columns (1) to (6), which rules out the 
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weak instrument variable concern. The Panel A shows the second stage results. Power 
concentration has a negative and significant effect on both total number of policy proposals 
and proposal per capita. The results are consistent after controlling individual and city 
indicators, and city and year fixed effects. I draw a similar conclusion with those in Table 
1. The reduction effect of power concentration is robust after dealing with the endogeneity 
concern. 
 
Table 3.8: Instrument Variable I: Power concentration and suspicious expenditure (2002-
2012) 
 
Notes: The analysis uses instrumental variables and two-stage least squares for panel-data models. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at prefecture level. Individual controls include age, gender, ethnic, 
education, and home city. City controls include population (logged), fiscal revenue(logged), GDP per 
capita (logged), and political cycle. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p< 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
 
Table 3.7 shows the estimated results using the second instrument variable. Panel 
B confirms that the proportion of dual appointment in neighboring cities has a positive and 
significant impact on power concentration in a city at 5% or 1% level. Panel A shows that 
power concentration significantly reduces the number of proposals and proposal per capita. 
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The estimated coefficients are much larger than those in Table 1, which implies that the 
power concentration effect becomes more salient after addressing the endogeneity issue. 
Table 3.9: Instrument Variable II: Power concentration and suspicious expenditure 
(2002-2012) 
 
Notes: The analysis uses instrumental variables and two-stage least squares for panel-data models. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at prefecture level. Individual controls include age, gender, ethnic, 
education, and home city. City controls include population (logged), fiscal revenue(logged), GDP per 
capita (logged), and political cycle. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p< 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
 
Second, I examine whether power concentration strengthens legislative oversights 
between 2002 and 2012. Table 3.8 presents the estimated results. Panel B shows that 
neighboring dual appointment dummy has a positive and significant on power 
concentration. It provides supporting evidence for the relevance assumption of IV. 
However, Panel A indicates that power concentration has no significant impact on 
suspicious expenditures in both periods across all specifications. In Table 3.9, I employ the 
second instrument variable to estimate the results. Similarly, Panel B shows that the 
proportion of dual appointment in neighboring cities is positively and significantly linked 
to power concentration. However, as shown in Panel A, the effect of power concentration 
is insignificant in all specifications. 
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In addition, Table B5 shows that power concentration has significant reduction 
effect on suspicious expenditure between 2006 and 2012. I use the two instrument variables 
to test the robustness of the results. In Table B7, the second stage results show that power 
concentration has no significant impact on suspicious expenditure after using the first 
instrument variable. Similarly, Table B8 show that power concentration has no evident 
consequence on suspicious expenditure using the second instrument variable. Both results 
indicate that power concentration has no salient consequence on suspicious expenditure 
between 2006 and 2012 after dealing with the endogeneity issue. 
In summary, I employ the adoption of dual appointment in neighboring cities in the 
previous year to instrument dual appointment in a city. The results show that power 
concentration significantly reduces the number of policy proposals from legislators. Power 
concentration may prevent bottom-up information flows, and legislators become less likely 
to tape local knowledge in congresses. Moreover, I demonstrate that power concentration 
has no salient impact on legislative oversights after addressing endogeneity issues. It shows 
that power concentration may be limited in terms of monitoring government budgets and 
improving local governance. 
CONCLUSION 
This study examines whether and how power concentration could shape legislative 
politics. I use the dual appointment of party and legislative leaders to identify power 
concentration and illustrate how the interaction of ruling party and legislatures shapes local 
legislative politics. My empirical analysis shows that power concentration could impede 
upward information flows from legislators and have no salient impact on the supervision 
of executive power. Though dual appointment may allow the ruling party to directly control 
congresses and have a large say in the appointment or removal of state officials and 
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legislative agenda setting. it is costly and exerts negative consequences on the operation of 
local legislatures. 
While the study focuses on local congresses in China, it may have broad 
implications. Local congresses are an important institutional channel to transfer local 
information from citizens to local party and government agents (Manion 2015). I 
demonstrate that the information gathering role of local congresses is not constant. 
Strengthened authority of legislative leaders may dampen the informational function of 
congresses. Delegates may conceal local grieves and become less likely to serve as bridges 
of rulers and citizens. As a result, the quality of bottom-up information may be deteriorated, 
and bad news can be filtered. Leaders rely on low-quality information to make decisions 
and promote policy implementation. 
This study illustrates potential consequences of power concentration. I use dual 
appointment of party and legislative leaders to identify power concentration, which ensures 
top party leaders to control appointment or removal of local officials, lawmaking, oversight 
of executive power, and other party and legislative resources. Power tends to be 
concentrated in the hands of a single leader and faces weak constraints. Geddes et al. (2018) 
show that the defining feature of personalism is the concentrated power that top leaders 
have dominant discretion over power instruments such as promotion, removal or 
punishment of officials. Dual appointment may facilitate power concentration and foster 
cult of personality, which may be at the cost of inhibiting bottom-up information flows and 
then undermining the quality of policymaking. 
Moreover, this study demonstrates that strong ruling party control may be 
inadequate to improve oversight of executive power. In recent years, China strengthens 
ruling party control in various government, legislative, and judicial institutions to curb 
corruption and improve local governance. Yet the study reveals that strong party control 
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over congresses have no salient consequence on oversight of executive power, proxied by 
misuse of government funds. Strengthening ruling party control may not achieve intended 
results. 
In addition, this study focuses on how dual appointment shapes legislative politics 
between 2002 and 2012. After 2012, China has initiated massed anti-corruption campaigns, 
and power becomes more concentrated at higher level of governments. It is unclear how 
these political changes shape legislative politics. I leave this question to be answered in 
future research. 
I mainly use the number of policy proposals to capture bottom-up information flow. 
Power concentration may alter both contents and quantities of policy proposals. After 
perceiving rising power of legislative leaders, legislators may submit less harsh or critical 
policy suggestions, or avoid revealing severe social problems. Even if legislators submit 
the same number of policy proposals, power concentration may still undermine quality of 
information from below. This study only shows that power concentration reduces the 
number of policy proposals. The negative consequences of power concentration on 
information flow may be underestimated. Due to data limitation, detailed contents of policy 
proposals at local congresses are not available. Future research may find a proper 
measurement of proposal contents and test this argument. 
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Chapter 4:  Corruption Monitoring and the Supply of Politicians in 
China26 
INTRODUCTION 
Human capital is a crucial resource for a government to function well. A 
professionalized and capable bureaucracy is the mark of the modern state (Weber 1978). 
The quality of political leaders impacts economic performance and the provision of public 
goods (Grossman and Hanlon 2014). A wide range of literature examines who chooses to 
become a politician in electoral politics (e.g., Besley and Reynal-Querol 2011; Fisman et 
al. 2015). However, there is a paucity of research on the supply of politicians in 
nondemocracies. Nondemocracies have unique logics and a variety of distinct mechanisms 
that contribute to the supply of politicians. For instance, nondemocracies are less inclusive 
than democracies when it comes to recruiting elites. Nondemocracies also tend to select 
less competent elites to fill political positions (Besley and Reynal-Querol 2011; Dal Bo  ́et 
al. 2017). 
Corruption monitoring institutions may play an important role in the supply of 
politicians. Institutions with poor accountability have a lower opportunity cost of 
corruption (in other words the risk of being caught is low), which allows rampant 
corruption and shirking (Platteau and Gaspart 2003) and motivates businessmen to run for 
office to further their business interests (Gehlbach, Sonin and Zhuravskaya 2010). 
Corrupted politicians even attract low-quality politicians to enter government (Caselli and 
Morelli 2004; Klašnja, Little and Tucker 2018). In contrast, the monitoring institution is 
an efficient instrument for reducing corruption and for improving government performance 
(Chen and Kung 2019; Li, Pang and Wu 2019). A rich literature documents the positive 
 
26 This chapter has been published in Governance: Yang, Wenhui. 2021. “Corruption monitoring and the 
supply of politicians in China.” Governance, 34(1), 229-249, doi.org/10.1111/gove.12488 
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effects of corruption monitoring institutions. However, the link between monitoring 
corruption and the supply of politicians in nondemocracies is under-investigated. 
To help fill this gap, this article employs China as a case to examine the political 
consequence of corruption monitoring. As the largest authoritarian regime, China provides 
a proper setting for examining this issue. In China’s one-party system, politicians are 
mainly selected from a limited pool of public employees. To become a national leader, a 
prospective elite needs to enter a political career path at a young age and climb the 
administration ladder from the bottom (Li and Walder 2001; Landry, Lü and Duan 2018). 
It is for this reason that the supply of public employees at the entry level is fundamental 
for the quality of future politicians. Moreover, limited rules or tools are available, or are 
used, to restrain the malfeasance of bureaucrats in China. Government officials have 
various rent-seeking opportunities as the scope of market reform has enlarged since the 
1990s (Wedeman 2012). However, to counteract this growth in corruption, the Chinese 
government has initiated several rounds of anti-corruption campaigns to curb the spread of 
corruption, with the strongest being the Anti-corruption Campaign started in 2013. 
I combine three waves of Chinese College Student Survey (CCSS) and corruption 
investigation data to examine the supply of potential politicians at the entry level. I 
demonstrate that corruption monitoring may fail to increase the supply of capable political 
candidates. Instead, the increase in corruption investigation pushes capable young elites 
away from seeking government positions. The results are robust and consistent under 
different specifications. 
Specifically, I argue that this effect may be driven by two possible mechanisms: 
economic returns and career prospects. First, capable young elites have better prospects for 
economic returns in the private sector and thus they incur a high opportunity cost if they 
serve in government. Corruption investigations may reduce the expected economic returns 
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for government officials, undermining capable young elite’ willingness and efforts to 
become government officials. The empirical results show that capable young elites expect 
a higher level of income, which lowers their likelihood of seeking a political career. 
Second, corruption investigations may signal the uncertainties and risks of a political 
career, which weakens capable young elites’ expectations about their political career 
prospects. The empirical results demonstrate that the downfall of government leaders rather 
than bureaucrats reduces the likelihood that capable young elites compete for government 
jobs. This reduction effect is more pronounced in areas with a prosperous market economy. 
CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION AND THE SUPPLY OF POLITICIANS 
In nondemocracies, corruption investigation may shape the supply of potential 
politicians through two possible channels: economic returns and career prospects. 
First, the economic return mechanism assumes that material interests shape the 
supply of capable politicians. Individuals with high ability can obtain more opportunities 
in private sectors and thus have a high opportunity cost if they choose to serve in 
government (Caselli and Morelli 2004). Hence, if the salary increases for politicians, the 
quality of politicians will also increase (Ferraz and Finan 2009). In contrast, the reduction 
of salary would disproportionately induce skilled politicians to exit public offices and enter 
the private sector (Keane and Merlo 2010). 
However, some studies doubt the positive role of pecuniary return in attracting 
capable elites in democracies. Pursuing a political career is self-selective. Higher salaries 
may reduce the ability threshold at which potential political candidates tend to run for 
public office (Fisman et al. 2015; Mattozzi and Merlo 2008). For instance, Fisman et al. 
(2015) present that high salaries lower the quality of elected Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs). Similarly, Poutvaara and Takalo (2007) show that the rise of material 
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reward may reduce the average candidate quality when the campaigning costs are quite 
high. 
These mixed results may be due to the heterogeneity of institutional contexts. 
Political accountability in nondemocracies is inherently weak. Nondemocracies tend to 
suffer from pervasive corruption. The pecuniary return of public offices thus includes both 
wages and rents. Rent extraction increases the supply of politician (Fisman, Schulz and 
Vig 2014). In contrast, corruption investigations reveal the enforcement of monitoring 
institutions, which may diminish the predicted rent-seeking opportunities of politicians and 
lower their pecuniary return. This could explain why corruption investigations could 
reduce the willingness of capable elites to serve in nondemocracies. 
Despite pecuniary return, nonpecuniary concerns are also important determinants 
of the supply of capable politicians. Notably, career prospects play a prominent role in the 
supply of politicians. In the ambition theory, Schlesinger (1966) argues that politicians 
have ambitions to move upwards and so they act in the present in ways that make them 
stronger candidates for the official positions they hope to serve in the future. For instance, 
career ambitions compel individuals to run for office or engage in legislative activities in 
the US (Høyland, Hobolt and Hix 2019; Lawless 2012). And it has been shown that in 
Brazil, ambitious legislators strategically use parties to advance their career (Desposato 
2006). 
Career prospects may motivate young elites to serve in public office. In 
authoritarian regimes, the selection of good politicians matters for political stability and 
regime resilience (Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin 2010). Authoritarian regimes have strong 
incentives to recruit capable political candidates. In China’s context, political selection at 
the subnational level tends to be merit-based (Li and Zhou 2005; Lü and Landry 2014). 
Hence, capable young elites have a better chance to enter government and advance their 
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careers. Young elites are attracted by the political power and the prestige of public office. 
The example of the career development of alumni politicians and the high social status of 
government officials contributes to motivating young elites to pursue a political career (Liu 
and Wang 2017). 
However, political ambition is not stable. Individuals adjust their career choices in 
response to macro political and economic changes. Corruption investigations, especially 
the investigation of government leaders, may shift young elites’ expectations about their 
career prospects. Authoritarian regimes have intense interjurisdiction political competition 
(Lü and Landry 2014). This power competition may drive the anti-corruption efforts. 
Authoritarian leaders may utilize anti-corruption campaigns to target rivals’ power in 
response to fierce power competition (Zhu and Zhang 2017). 
Rule of law is generally weak in authoritarian regimes. The anti-corruption effort 
may indicate serious political purges as well as power struggles. This increases the 
uncertainties and risks of a political career, which may undermine the young elites’ 
political ambition. 
MONITORING CORRUPTION AND ELITE RECRUITMENT IN CHINA 
China has a long history of meritocracy. The government uses civil service exams 
and merit-based promotion to recruit officials (Elman 2013). In contemporary China, the 
civil service exam is the primary channel for citizens entering government. The Chinese 
government sought to improve civil service performance by introducing more competitive 
selection processes (Burns and Wang 2010). The National Civil Service Examination 
(NCSE) was initiated in the 1990s. The government gradually expanded the application of 
the civil service exam system to different levels of government. Since the Civil Service 
Law of 2006, all entry-level political positions have to be recruited from a pool of people 
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who have taken the civil service exam. Both central and local governments have adopted 
the civil service exam to recruit bureaucrats (Ko and Han 2013). The introduction of NCSE 
provided an opportunity for millions of young people to compete for public positions at the 
entry-level, thereby institutionalizing government recruitment process (Liu 2019). 
In China, government employees are better paid and enjoy better non-pecuniary 
benefits than non-government employees (Huang 2014; Li et al. 2014). Government 
officials also have various rent-seeking opportunities as the scope of market reform has 
enlarged (Wedeman 2012). Moreover, holding government positions has high social 
esteem and brings glory to families and clans (Liu and Wang 2017). 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Investigated Officials and Civil Service Exam Participators 
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Young elites have a high desire to compete for government positions. Figure 4.1 
depicts the trend of NCSE participants and investigated officials. In 2008, about 0.64 
million citizens participated in the NCSE. The number increased by 71.9% and reached 1.1 
million in 2013. After the start of Anti-corruption Campaign in 2013, the increased interest 
in participating in the NCSE changed. In 2015, the number of NCSE participants sharply 
decreased to 0.9 million.27  Before the Anti-corruption Campaign, the NCSE recruitment 
rate (the available government job positions divided by the NCSE participants) was about 
1.69 % in 2011. 
Due to the decline of NCSE participants, the recruitment rate increased to 2.5% in 
2015. Competition for government positions became less fierce. Moreover, the number of 
civil service exam participants varies across provinces. Figure C1 depicts the distribution 
of civil service exam participants. In general, citizens living in less developed areas 
(western provinces) were more enthusiastic about competing for government positions. 
China has strengthened anti-corruption efforts in recent years. Routine anti-
corruption enforcement has not worked to institutionalize the relevance of law and curb 
pervasive corruption. This is what led to China initiating the widespread Anti-corruption 
Campaign in 2013. As Figure 1 shows, the number of investigated officials increased by 
8.07 % from 2008 to 2011 and increased by 14.60 % between 2012 to 2015.28 And 120 
senior officials at provincial-level or above were investigated between 2012 and 2017. A 
much larger number of officials were punished by internal party disciplines. For instance, 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) announced the Eight-Point Regulation issued in 
December 2012 to constrain officials’ behavior. These regulations were aimed at banning 
 
27  The NCSE participants data is collected from Sina Education: Available from edu.sina.com.cn/ 
official/2017-10-18/doc-ifymvuyt3948469.shtml, accessed 20 July 2019. 
28 The total number of investigated officials is collected from the annual report of the Supreme People's 
Procuratorate in China. 
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bribes and luxury consumption by government officials, and reducing ceremonies, 
banquets and meetings. About 0.26 million government officials were sanctioned for 
violating the Eight-Point Regulation in the period between 2012 to 2017. 29 
However, Figure 4.1 only presents the general trends. It is still unclear whether 
corruption investigation contribute to the decline of civil service exam participants in 
China. The variation of anti-corruption efforts across provinces and years allows me to 
investigate the consequence of corruption investigation on the supply of potential 
politicians at entry level. 
 
DATA AND VARIABLE 
Data 
In this article, I mainly employ the three waves of the Chinese College Student 
Survey (CCSS) from 2010, 2013 and 2015. The CCSS was conducted by the China Data 
Center at Tsinghua University. The data set provides rich information on students’ 
individual characteristics, family background, academic performance, and career 
preference, allowing me to investigate the nexus of corruption monitoring and the supply 
of political candidates. 
The CCSS utilized stratified random sampling to collect the samples. One hundred 
colleges were drawn at random from China’s 2305 colleges. Next, stratifying variables 
were used to sample colleges from the 100 colleges according to college location (Beijing, 
Shanghai, Tianjin, northeastern China, eastern China, central China, and western China) 
and college type (elite and non-elite) (Li et al. 2012). Undergraduate students in a 
 
29 Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) website: Available from www.ccdi.gov.cn/ 
yaowen/201712/t20171204_151067.html, accessed 20 July 2019. 
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graduating class were randomly selected from each college. In the analysis, samples are 
weighted to represent the population. 
Variable 
The key dependent variable is the supply of politicians. Two variables are used to 
capture the supply of potential politicians. First, I construct the government career 
preference dummy to capture students’ willingness to enter government. The CCSS asked 
students about their ideal workplaces including government and party branches, social 
organizations, public institutions, SOEs, foreign enterprises and private enterprises. If a 
student prefers to work in government and party branches, the government career 
preference is coded as 1, otherwise it is coded as 0. Second, I use whether respondents took 
the civil service exam to identify their actual behaviors of competing for government 
positions. Taking civil service exam is coded as 1, otherwise 0. 
The key independent variable is corruption monitoring. The article mainly utilizes 
investigated officials per capita to proxy corruption monitoring. The investigated officials 
per capita refers to the number of investigated officials in each province divided by the 
number of public employees in that province. Provincial annual procuratorate reports 
provide the number of investigated officials in the past year. The number of public 
employees was collected from the China Statistical Yearbook. I then matched investigated 
officials per capita with students’ home provinces. In the sample, 61.30% of students attend 
college in their home provinces. Students’ family networks are embedded in local political 
and economic context. Hence, they may often perceive the governments’ anti-corruption 
efforts through kinship networks. 
One concern is that the number of corruption investigations may reflect corruption 
level rather than the strength of corruption monitoring. China has a limited checks and 
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balances system set up to restrain the malfeasance of bureaucrats. Corruption is pervasive 
and its growth can be substantial (Manion 2004). Yet I show that corruption investigations 
are more likely to demonstrate the government’s anti-corruption effort in Figure C2. 
I use the College Entrance Examination (CEE) score to identify ability. Educational 
attainment is widely used to measure the quality of political candidates (Besley and 
ReynalQuerol 2011; Dal Bó et al. 2017; Ferraz and Finan 2009; Galasso and Nannicini 
2011). In China, CEE scores are almost the only criteria used for determining college 
admissions. Senior high school students devote great efforts to improve their scores. CEE 
scores are essentially effective measures of student ability (Li et al. 2012). Students need 
to take the exam in their home province. The maximum score is 750 in nearly all provinces. 
Exam contents vary in different provinces and in different years. To make the CEE score 
comparable, the CEE score is normalized by provinces and years. 
Furthermore, I control for a series of covariants in the analysis. For instance, 
political connection plays an important role in political selection (Landry, Lü and Duan 
2018; Shih, Adolph and Liu 2012). For entry level political positions, family background 
is a critical source of political connection. In China, the children of government officials 
have a higher possibility of entering an elite college, of enjoying wage premiums, and they 
have a higher possibility of being recruited into government (Li et al. 2012; Liu 2019; Yang 
and Chen 2016). Individuals are viewed to have a political connection if at least one of the 
parents is a senior government or enterprise leader.30  I also control for parent Communist 
Party member dummy, parental educational levels, and annual income to capture parental 
social economic status. 
 
30 The survey does not distinguish government or enterprises' leaders. Senior government and enterprise 
leaders are in the same category. 
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Elite colleges are a crucial source of future politicians because elite college students 
may be more likely to choose a political career (Liu and Wang 2017). The elite college 
dummy is also controlled. In China, elite colleges are commonly referred to as the Project-
211 universities, and they account for about 4.8% of total colleges. 
Students’ demographic characteristics matter for the supply of politicians. I control 
for gender, age, and rural household registration status (hukou). In addition, individual’ 
ideological position is a crucial determinant of serving in government. I use students’ 
Communist Party membership to capture the influence of ideological position. In the 
Chinese political system, political elites tend to transform from technocrats to economic 
regulators with the legal and economic discipline background (Li 2008). Students in the 
social science majors tend to have a higher chance for entering government. The social 
science major dummy is thus controlled.31 College academic performance is an important 
indicator of students who attempt to enter graduate school and find jobs. I use college grade 
rank to capture their academic performance.32 
Economic development and corruption are closely linked. Corruption can hinder 
economic development by lowering investment, by reducing human capital, and by 
discounting government spending (Mauro 1995; Wei 1999). Economic development 
creates various rent-seeking opportunities. Thus, I employ provincial GDP per capita to 
capture the influence of economic development. The descriptive statistics are shown in 
Table C1. 
 
31 Social science dummy is 1 if students' disciplines are law, sociology, economics, political science or 
public administration, otherwise is coded as 0. 
32 The college grade rank has 5 categories. It shows students' relative position in related majors. The rank 
has five categories: top 5% (5), top 5% - 20% (4), top 20% - 50% (3), 50% - 80% (2), and bottom 20% (1). 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The article mainly investigates whether corruption investigations attract or alienate 
capable young elites. I first use a binary logistical model to check if corruption 
investigation directly shapes the supply of potential politicians. 
Table 4.1 reports the baseline results. Columns (1) and (4) show the baseline results 
including only investigated officials per capita and province and year dummies. The 
coefficients on investigated officials per capita are positive but insignificant. After adding 
demographic and family background controls in column (2) and (5), the coefficients on 
investigated officials per capita are still insignificant. In columns (3) and (6), I further 
incorporate GDP per capita to proxy for local economic development. The coefficients on 
investigated officials per capita have no salient effects on government career preference or 
civil service exam participation. 
Overall, Table 4.1 reveals that the enforcement of corruption monitoring has no 
direct consequence on the supply of politicians across different specifications. The results 
provide evidence that monitoring institution in nondemocracies may be limited to promote 










Table 4.1: Monitoring Corruption and the Supply of Politicians 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at college level are in parentheses. Estimates of constant are 
not reported. All regressions are weighted to represent the population. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ 
p< 0.01. 
 
I then investigate whether the consequence of corruption investigation is 







) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑀𝑗𝑡−1 × 𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑀𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑋𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 (4) 
 
where 𝑖 indicates individual, j denotes province, and t refers to year. 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the probability 
that individual i prefers a political career or participates the civil service exam. 𝑀𝑗𝑡−1 is 
monitoring corruption, which is investigated officials per capita at province j in the previ-
ous year. 𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡  captures individual i’s ability. 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the vector of individual i’s 
demographic characteristics. 𝑋𝑗𝑡−1 is provincial covariant. 𝛾𝑗 is a set of province fixed 
effects. 𝛿𝑡 captures year fixed effects. To reduce the heteroscedasticity of disturbance, 
robust standard error is clustered at college level. All regressions are weighted to represent 
the population. 
In Table 4.2, column (1) depicts the baseline results. The coefficient for the 
interaction term is negative and significant at 5% level. After adding demographic controls 
in column (2), the magnitude of coefficient becomes larger and significant at 5% level. 
Column (3) adds both demographic controls and provincial GDP per capita. The result is 
consistent and similar. The enforcement of corruption monitoring evidently reduces 
capable young elites’ willingness to serve in government. 
Participating in the civil service exam reveals students’ actual behavior when it 
comes to seeking a political career. Columns (4) to (6) of Table 4.2 estimate the conditional 
effect of monitoring corruption on the probability of participating in the civil service exam. 
Column (4) presents the baseline results. The estimated coefficient for the interaction term 
is negative and significant at 1% level. I incorporate demographic controls in column (5), 
the coefficient of the interaction term is still negative and significant at 1% level. After 
adding all controls in column (6), the magnitude of the coefficient is similar and significant.  
 
 107 
Table 4.2: Monitoring Corruption and the Supply of Politicians 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at college level are in parentheses. Estimates of constant are not 
reported. All regressions are weighted to represent the population. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p< 
0.01. 
The results indicate that the enforcement of corruption monitoring decreases the 
likelihood of capable young elites to take the civil service exam. Overall, Table 4.2 
demonstrates that monitoring corruption can reduce the supply of capable young elites who 





Figure 4.2: Monitoring Corruption, Ability on the Supply of Politicians 
Notes: Figure 4.2(a) uses the estimated results in column (3) in Table 4.2 and demonstrates the average 
marginal effect of corruption investigation on preferring a political career. Figure 4.2(b) adopts the 
estimated results in column (6) in Table 4.2 and shows the average marginal effect of corruption 
investigation on civil service exam participation. The two figures indicate the 90% confidence intervals 
of the marginal effects. 
 
To facilitate interpretation, Figure 4.2 shows the average marginal effect of 
corruption investigation on the supply of potential politicians at different levels of innate 
ability. Figure 4.2 (a) shows that the average marginal effect of corruption monitoring on 
political career preference decreases as the ability increases. Figure 4.2 (b) presents that 
average marginal effect of corruption monitoring on the likelihood of taking civil service 
exam decreases as the ability increases. Additionally, the magnitude of marginal effect on 
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civil service exam participation is larger than that of political career preference at the same 
ability level. 
Despite the main results, Table 4.1 and 4.2 suggest that several individual 
characteristics have a significant impact on the supply of politicians. Male students have a 
stronger tendency to serve in government than female students, yet they have no salient 
difference in taking the civil service exam. Students’ Communist Party membership is a 
strong predictor of the supply of politicians: party members are more likely to prefer a 
political career and are more likely to take the civil service exam. Similarly, if students 
have at least one parents who is party member, they have a higher likelihood of preferring 
a political career and of competing for government positions. Students in social science 
majors have a higher probability of choosing a political career and of taking the civil 
service exam. Political connection has a positive effect on the likelihood of selecting a 
political career, yet it has no salient consequence on the chance that someone takes the civil 
service exam. 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
In this section, I conduct several robustness checks to confirm the main results. The 
regression results of the robustness checks are shown in the Appendix. 
First, I employ alternative empirical specifications. The main results adopt a binary 
logistic model. Though logistic models may estimate the Conditional Expectation Function 
(CEF) for binary outcomes more closely, that matters little when it comes to estimating 
marginal effects. Binary logistic models obtain lower estimation efficiency than linear 
models do when the prior distribution of probability is moderate (Angrist and Pischke 
2008). The estimation results by a linear probability model are less complicated and is 
easier to interpret. Thus, I replicate the main results using linear probability models in 
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Table C2. The results reveal that the coefficients of interaction term of investigated 
officials per capita and ability are negative and significant across all specifications. Both 
linear and non-linear models draw consistent and similar conclusions. 
Multiplicative interaction models raise concerns such as non-linear interaction 
effects and excessive extrapolation, I follow Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu (2019) in 
using a binning estimator to address the issue. Figure C3 (a) presents that corruption 
monitoring only has a significant and positive effect on political career preference for 
individuals with a low level of ability. Figure C3 (b) demonstrates that corruption 
monitoring has a significant reducing effect on individuals with medium or high levels of 
ability taking the civil service exam. The results confirm that corruption monitoring may 
reduce the number of capable young elites who compete for government positions. 
Furthermore, Figure C3 implies that most respondents have a nominalized CEE 
score within the range [-3,3]. One concern is that the main results may be driven by extreme 
values of ability, which could be misleading and biased. To mitigate this concern, I restrict 
the analysis for respondents whose ability lies within the range [-3,3]. In Table C3, the 
estimated results are consistent with the main findings. Figure C4 (a) indicates that 
corruption monitoring only significantly attracts individuals with low ability to prefer a 
political career; Figure C4 (b) reveals that corruption monitoring significantly reduces the 
likelihood of individuals with medium and high innate ability to compete for government 
positions. Both figures demonstrate that corruption monitoring fails to attract capable 
young elites to work in government. Instead, it pushes them away from seeking government 
positions. 
Corruption monitoring is not exogenous. Observed and unobserved confounders 
may shape corruption monitoring and government career preference at the same time. For 
instance, market activities such as the mining of coal and minerals, a real estate boom, or 
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road construction can shape official corruption in China (Feng, Gao and Zhang 2018). 
These factors could also affect an individual’s career opportunities and choices (Hong and 
Yang 2020). To mitigate the concern, main results are replicated by controlling more macro 
covariants. Table C4 demonstrates the new results after adding covariants including oil, 
coal, minerals, road construction, real estate added value, and the proportion of private 
employment. The analysis confirms that corruption monitoring evidently reduces the 
chances that capable young elites pursue a political career. The development of private 
economies and the real estate boom weaken young people’s willingness and attempts to 
work in government, yet rich coal reserves significantly motivate young people to prefer 
government jobs and take civil service exams. 
In addition, the instrumental variable method is adopted to address the endogeneity 
concern. I constructed an instrument variable using British leased territory in late imperial 
China. The section B.4 in the Appendix discusses reasons for using the instrument variable. 
Table C5 presents the estimation results. Panel B shows the first stage results: British leased 
territory is positively and significantly related to investigated officials per capita at 1% 
level. Panel A demonstrates the second stage estimation results. Column (1) implies that 
corruption monitoring has no direct effect on government career preference. Similarly, 
column (3) shows that corruption monitoring significantly reduces the likelihood of 
individuals taking the civil service exam. Both columns (1) and (3) show that the 
enforcement of corruption monitoring fails to increase the supply of government 
employees. Columns (2) and (4) in Table C5 examine the conditional effect of corruption 
monitoring on the supply of potential politicians. The estimated results in columns (2) and 
(4) confirm that corruption monitoring tends to reduce capable young elites’ willingness 
and efforts to enter government. The main results are robust and consistent using the 
instrumental variable method. 
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Finally, as a robustness check, standard errors are clustered at the provincial level. 
In the main analysis, I cluster standard errors at the college level to deal with potential 
heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation for students in the same college. However, I 
cannot rule out serial autocorrelation within home province clusters. To allay this concern, 
I replicate the main results by clustering standard errors at provincial level in Table C6-C9. 
In general, the results are consistent with those in Table 4.1-4.4. The Appendix discusses 
the estimated results in detail (See section B.5). Figure C5 shows the marginal effect plots 




In this section, I test two mechanisms discussed in the theoretical section: economic 
returns and career prospects. 
Economic Returns 
First, I examine whether economic return explains why corruption monitoring can 
reduce the supply of capable young elites for the government. The economic return 
mechanism assumes that capable young elites have higher expected incomes and 
opportunity costs. In the survey questionnaire, there is a question that asks respondents for 
their ideal monthly salary. I use the logarithmic ideal salary to capture the expected income. 
In Table 4.3, column (1) presents the baseline result and estimates whether capable young 
elites have higher expected salaries. It shows that the coefficient of ability is positive and 
significant at 5% level. After adding demographic and provincial controls in column (2), 
the results remain significant. College grade rank is positively linked to the predicted 
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salaries. It confirms that students with better academic performance and ability tend to 
demand higher salaries. 
Table 4.3: Mechanism I: Economic Returns 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at college level are in parentheses. Estimates of constant are not 




I then investigate whether high salary expectations motivate individuals to serve in 
the government. In columns (3) and (4) of Table 4.3, the full sample analysis shows that 
ideal salary significantly reduces students’ likelihood of taking civil service exam. It 
implies that when individuals have high salary expectations, they seek positions in the 
market sector rather than in public sector. 
Due to data limitations, the data for respondents’ expected salary in the government 
is unavailable. Yet those preferring a political career are more likely to link their expected 
salaries to earnings in the government. In columns (5) and (6) of Table 4.3, I conduct a 
subgroup analysis by only including individuals preferring government jobs. Column (5) 
presents baseline results and shows that ideal salary evidently reduces their chance of 
taking the civil service exam. After adding more controls in column (6), the results remain 
robust and consistent. The magnitude of the coefficient for ideal salary in column (5) is 
two times larger than that in column (3). Similarly, the magnitude of the coefficient for 
ideal salary in column (6) is two times larger than that in column (4). The results reveal 
that ideal salary is more likely to reduce the chance of taking the civil service exam among 
those preferring a political career. They are more sensitive to the change of salary in 
government. This evidence provides support for the economic return mechanism. 
Individuals make career choices between market and public sectors. The wage 
differences between the two sectors may shape their career choices. In Figure C6, I plot the 
comparison of wages in public sectors and average wage in all sectors in China. Before 
2012, the wage in public sectors was larger than the average national wage. Yet the gap 
sharply diminished. Civil servants earned less than the national average between 2012 and 
2014, when a sweeping anti-corruption campaign took effect. 
Furthermore, I collected wage information in each province and divided the sample 
into two subgroups: low government wages and high government wages. In China, regions 
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have great disparities, so wages may not be comparable across provinces. Thus, a low 
government wage group refers to areas where government wage is equal or below the local 
average wage (wage ratio ≤ 1). It implies that government jobs are less attractive in terms 
of wage. In contrast, a high wage group refers to provinces where government wages are 
above the local average wage (wage ratio > 1). 
In Table C10, I replicate the main results in Table 4.2 in the two groups. Columns 
(1) and (4) reveal the full sample results. Column (2) demonstrates that corruption 
monitoring evidently reduces capable young elites’ likelihood to prefer a political career 
in low government wage provinces. Yet the effect is not salient in the high government 
wage group as shown in column (3). Similarly, column (5) demonstrates that monitoring 
corruption significantly reduces the number of capable young elites competing for 
government positions in low government wage areas. Yet the reduction effect disappears 
in areas with high government wages. To facilitate interpretation, Figure C7 plots the 
coefficients of interaction terms among different groups. Under the enforcement of 
corruption monitoring, capable young elites may turn to seek more lucrative positions in 
market sectors when the local government wage is below the average. These results provide 
strong evidence that economic returns could explain why corruption monitoring pushes 
capable young elites away from seeking government positions. 
Career Prospects 
The career prospect mechanism implies that political power and the prestige of 
public office induce young people to pursue positions in government. However, 
nondemocracies have a comparatively weak rule of law and opaque judicial procedures. 
Corruption investigations may involve power struggles and political purges. Investigations 
of officials, especially senior officials, may signal the serious uncertainties and risks of a 
 116 
political career, which can then undermine the supply of capable young elites for the 
government. 
To test the mechanism, I use the Anti-Corruption Campaign launched in 2013 as a 
policy shock. China initiates periodic anti-corruption campaigns, but the anti-corruption 
campaigns of the 1980s and 1990s failed to curb widespread corruption (Manion 2004). 
However, Manion (2016) shows that the Anti-Corruption Campaign launched in 2013 
differs notably from previous efforts. It significantly decreased bureaucrats’ corruption 
opportunities and reduced obstacles to anti-corruption enforcement. It is a sincere effort to 
cut down on pervasive corruption (Lorentzen and Lu 2018). The Anti-Corruption 
Campaign launched in 2013 thus constitutes a salient shock for corruption investigations. 
If the career prospect mechanism holds true, we may predict that the investigations 
of senior officials have a more evident effect on the supply of capable political candidates. 
The majority of investigated officials are grass-root bureaucrats. Instead of using 
investigated officials per capita, I use the number of investigated leaders at vice county-
division rank (xianchuji) and above to proxy the strength of corruption monitoring. During 
the three waves of the survey, the maximum number of investigated leaders among 
provinces was 297, while the minimum number was 6. On average, provinces investigated 








Table 4.4: Mechanism II: Career Prospects 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at college level are in parentheses. Estimates of constant are not 
reported. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p< 0.01. 
 
The survey data covers three periods (2010, 2013, and 2015), which allows me to 
employ the difference-in-difference (DID) method to estimate whether the investigated 
leaders shape individual career choices. I divide respondents into two subgroups: elite 
college students and non-elite college students. As the College Entrance Exam (CEE) grade 
is nearly the only determinant for most of the students who enter elite colleges, elite college 
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enrollment can be another proxy of ability. Table 4.4 presents the subgroup analysis using 
the DID method. Columns (1) to (3) estimate whether investigations of government leaders 
change elite college students’ likelihood of taking the civil service exam. Column (1) is the 
baseline result, showing that the coefficient of interaction term is negative and significant 
at 5% level. After controlling for demographic covariants in column (2) and adding full 
controls in column (3), the results are similar and consistent. After the Anti-Corruption 
Campaign, the investigation of government leaders significantly reduces the probability of 
elite college students taking the civil service exam. 
Moreover, columns (4) to (6) in Table 4.4 examine whether the investigation of 
government leaders shifts the behavior of non-elite college students. Column (4) reveals 
that corruption investigation has no significant consequence on the probability of non-elite 
college students taking the civil service exam. The coefficient of interaction term remains 
insignificant after adding demographic and full controls in columns (5) and (6). The results 
suggest that the investigation of government leaders fails to change non-elite college 
students’ likelihood of seeking government positions. 
Furthermore, I use similar specifications to examine the effect of investigations of 
government officials in Table C11. Column (1) reveals that investigations of government 
bureaucrats reduces elite college students’ chances of taking civil service exam. Yet the 
reduction effect is not significant after adding more controls in columns (2) and (3). The 
results reveal that the investigation of government leaders rather than bureaucrats reduces 
the likelihood of capable young elites to compete for government positions. The downfall 
of government leaders is more likely to signal the great uncertainties and risks of a political 
career, which could shift capable young elites’ expectation about political career prospects. 
In contrast, as shown in columns (4) to (6), investigations of government officials actually 
promotes non-elite college students’ chances of taking the civil service exam. The downfall 
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of grassroots bureaucrats may imply more vacant government positions and employment 
opportunities, which may attract non-elite college students. 
Finally, Table C4 shows that the proportion of private employment reduces 
individuals’ likelihood of selecting a political career. The development of private 
economies may provide more career opportunities and platforms. To further test the career 
prospect mechanism, I divide the sample into two groups: low level and high level of 
private economy. Low level of private economy refers to areas where the proportion of 
private employment is below the national median value (0.62). High level of private 
economy refers to provinces where the proportion of private employment is above the 
national median value. The subgroup analysis in columns (3) and (4) of Table C12 shows 
that corruption monitoring has a greater reduction effect for capable young elites 
competing for government jobs in areas with high development level of private economy. 
The prosperity of market sectors provides more alternative career opportunities. Corruption 
monitoring is more likely to push young elites in those areas to select a career in the market 
sector. 
In sum, the analysis shows that investigations of government leaders and 
bureaucrats have heterogeneous effects among elite and non-elite college students. The 
downfall of government leaders rather than bureaucrats reduces the number of elite college 
students competing for government jobs. This effect is more evident in areas with a 
prosperous market economy. The results provide evidence that career prospects can be an 
important mechanism shaping young elites’ career choices. 
CONCLUSION 
The article examines the impacts of corruption monitoring on the supply of 
potential politicians in China. Corruption monitoring is an efficient tool for improving 
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government efficiency and performance, yet I demonstrate that monitoring corruption may 
reduce the quality of the political candidate pool. The enforcement of monitoring 
corruption may reduce capable young elites’ willingness and efforts to select a political 
career. 
In authoritarian regimes, the enforcement of monitoring corruption may have a 
trade-off: the anti-corruption effort may constrain the behaviors of government officials, 
while at the same time it may reduce the supply of capable elites at the entry level. It is 
these entry level government employees who become the politicians of the future. It is 
possible that nondemocracies will need a period to establish strong monitoring institutions 
and to shape stable and proper expectations of potential political candidates for government 
positions. Moreover, loyalty and competence are two key criteria for those government 
employees who do become politicians. Due to data limitations, I only investigated the 
competence dimension in the supply of candidates for government positions. It is possible 
that the enforcement of monitoring institutions can attract young elites with high public 
service motivation. I leave this question to be explored in future research. 
The study contributes to the political selection literature in China. Recent studies 
have focused mostly on political selection among government officials and examined the 
demand side of political selection. Scholars have also investigated the role of performance 
and political connection in government officials’ career advancement (e.g., Li and Zhou 
2005; Landry, Lü and Duan 2018; Shih, Adolph and Liu 2012). However, politicians are 
mainly selected from a limited pool of public employees in China. Serving in government 
is self-selected. The pool of public employees matters for the competence of future 
politicians. Few studies investigate the supply of potential politicians at the entry level. 
College students constitute the main source of new government employees. I show that 
monitoring institutions may shape the supply of capable politicians in the future. 
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Furthermore, this article examines the links between corruption monitoring and the 
supply of potential politicians. Entering government is not equal to becoming a politician. 
Only a very small proportion of civil servants become leaders in the political system. Yet 
capable young civil servants are critical candidates for future politicians. To become a 
national leader, a prospective elite needs to be well-educated and start a political career 
path at a young age. 
For instance, the political bureaus of the 19th CPC Central Committee are a group 
of 25 politicians who rule China. On average, they entered government at the age of 23.2. 
64% of them hold degrees from elite colleges, and 32% of them obtained their 
undergraduate degrees from elite colleges. They have worked in government for more than 
30 years. This shows that China has historically relied upon the young elite to climb the 
ladder and become the politicians of their day. This model confronts great challenges as 
the market economy expands and it may impact the quality of China’s future politicians. 
Thus, the article provides evidence for the potential risks of the political candidate 
pool in China’s political system. However, the competition for government positions is still 
fierce in China. The recruitment rate of China’s civil service exam is lower than any Ivy 
League university and Chinese bureaucrats even report greater meritocracy than U.S. 
federal employees (Boittin, Distelhorst and Fukuyama 2017). Though the investigation of 
corruption may push capable young elites away from seeking government positions, 
governments still have a large candidate pool from which they can select bureaucrats. 
Future research may examine whether anti-corruption efforts lower the quality of 








Figure A1: The Data on Chairmen of MPC 
Notes: The figure shows an example of identifying individual characteristics of chairman at one 
prefecture (Ningde in Fujian Province). The biographic information was recorded in Historical 






Figure A2: The Data on Legislative Activities 
Notes: The figure gives an example of identifying legislative activities at one prefecture (Baoji in 
Shaanxi province) in 2011. It shows that the number of legislators attending the annual conference of 
people’s congress was 375, the total number of personnel appointment and removal was 52, and the 
number of policy proposals, suggestions, and critics were 172. The data comes from the section of 
people’s congress in the Yearbook of Baoji 2012. 
  
 124 
APPENDIX B: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 3 
 
Table B1: Robustness Check: Power concentration and legislators’ policy proposal 
 






Table B2: Robustness Check: Power concentration and legislators’ policy proposal, 
lagged one year period 
 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at prefecture level. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p< 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
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Table B3: Robustness Check: Exclude Ethnic Regions 
 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at prefecture level. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p< 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
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Table B4: Robustness Check: Exclude Vice Provincial Cities 
 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at prefecture level. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p< 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
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Table B5: Robustness Check: Power concentration and suspicious expenditures (2006-
2012) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at prefecture level. The analysis includes data between 2006 
and 2012. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p< 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
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Table B6: Robustness Check: Exclusive Restriction Test 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at prefecture level. Population, GDP per capita, fiscal 
revenue are in logarithmic values. Political competition refers to the number of counties within a 
prefecture. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p< 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
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Table B7: Instrument Variable I: Power concentration and suspicious expenditure (2006-
2012) 
 
Notes: The analysis uses instrumental variables and two-stage least squares for panel-data models. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at prefecture level. Individual controls include age, gender, ethnic, 
education, and home city. City controls include population (logged), fiscal revenue(logged), GDP per 




Table B8: Instrument Variable II: Power concentration and suspicious expenditure (2006-
2012) 
 
Notes: The analysis uses instrumental variables and two-stage least squares for panel-data models. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at prefecture level. Individual controls include age, gender, ethnic, 
education, and home city. City controls include population (logged), fiscal revenue(logged), GDP per 
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A Data Description 
 






(a) Average Number of Civil Servant Exam Participants Divided by Population  
 
(b) Average Number of Civil Servant Exam Participants (10,000) 
Figure C1: Distribution of Civil Service Exam Participants (2011-2015) 
Notes: The number of civil servant exam participants in each province was collected from 
www.chinagwy.org/html/xwsz/ zyxw/201601/21_136979.html (accessed 20 July 2019) and 
gongwuyuan.eol.cn/guojia/gkzx/201710/t20171026_1562092.shtml34 (accessed 20 July 2019). Figure 
A1 (a) plots the number of civil service exam participants divided by population, Figure A1 (b) shows 






Figure C2: Investigated Officials and Corruption Perception Index (2001-2017) 
Notes: The figure depicts the trend of national investigated officials and the Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) in China. CPI is surveyed by Transparency International. It measures the perception of corrupt 
public sectors. A high CPI score reflects a lower perception of corruption. The figure shows that the 
number of investigated officials is positively linked with CPI in China. It implies the investigation of 
corrupted officials tends to reduce perceived corruption and improve CPI performance. Investigated 
officials per capita captures the inherent meaning of corruption monitoring. 
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B Additional Robustness Check 
B1 Robustness Check: Use Linear Probability Model 
Table C2: Robustness Check: Replicate Main Results Using Linear Probability Model 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at college level are in parentheses. Estimates of constant are not 






Figure C3: Marginal Effect Using Linear Probability Model 
Notes: The left figure (a) uses the estimated results in column (3) in Table C2. The right figure (b) 
adopts the estimated results in column (6) in Table A2. The two figures plot the marginal effect of 
corruption monitoring across various level of ability. L, M, and H indicate the 95% confidence intervals 
of the marginal effects at the low, medium, and high level of ability. 
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B2 Robustness Check: With Smaller Ability Range 
 
Table C3: Robustness Check: Replicate Main Results Using Smaller Ability Range [-3,3] 
 
Notes: The analysis only includes respondents whose ability lies within the range of -3 and 3. Robust 
standard errors clustered at college level are in parentheses. Estimates of constant are not reported. All 






Figure C4: Marginal Effect With Smaller Ability Range [-3,3] 
Notes: The left figure (a) uses the estimated results in column (3) in Table C3. The right figure (b) 
adopts the estimated results in column (6) in Table C3. The two figures plot the marginal effect of 




B.3 Robustness Check: With More Macro Controls 
Many macro covariants may shape the political corruption and the the supply of 
politicians at the same time. I added more controls including natural resources, real estate 
development, road construction and private economy. The following table presents the 
main results. Specifically, Oil refers to the estimated oil reserves (10,000 ton), coal refers 
to the coal reserves (10,000 ton), Mineral refers to the total reserves of iron, manganese, 
titanium ore, chromium ore and vanadium (10,000 ton). Road is the road density, which 
equals to the annual new roads divided by land area in each province. Proportion of private 
employment is the number of employees in private sector divided by total employees. All 




Table C4: Robustness Check: Replicate Main Results with More Covariants 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at college level are in parentheses. Due to space limit, constants 
are not reported. Models have the same controls with Column (3) in Table 4.2. Controls include all 
individual characteristics. All regressions are weighted to represent the population. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p< 




B.4 Robustness Check: Instrument Variable Method 
There are several reasons why Britain leased territory is a proper instrument 
variable. First, Britain leased territory is related to the constraint of executive power. 
Scholars point out that colonization by Europeans may compel countries to adopt better 
political institutions for securing property rights and for protecting against “risk of 
expropriation” (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001). Specifically, the British tradition 
imposed limits on government, established norms for the exercise of power, and generated 
procedures for the management of conflicts (Weiner 1987). In addition, areas with histories 
of British rule tend to be less corrupt (Treisman 2000). 
After the Opium War in the late Qing dynasty, Britain established seven leased 
territories in China.33 The establishment of British leased territory may have long-term 
consequences on the quality of local political institutions. But historical Britain leased 
territories are unlikely to be directly linked with individuals’ career preference. 
Moreover, scholars widely use British leased territory as an instrumental variable 
for property rights protection or anti-corruption effort in China (e.g., Ang, Cheng and Wu 
2014; Xu and Yano 2017). Following this line of research, I constructed a British leased 
territory dummy to instrument corruption monitoring. If a province has at least one 
historically British leased territory, the British leased territory dummy is equal to 1, 
otherwise it is 0. 
  
 




Table C5: Robustness check: Instrument Variable Method 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at college level are in parentheses. All regressions are weighted 
to represent the population. Estimates of constant are not reported. Due to space limit, controls are not 
reported. The first and second stage have the same controls with the column (3) in Table 1. ∗ p < 0.1; 




B.5 Robustness Check: Clustering at the Provincial Level 
In this section, I replicate the main results by clustering standard errors at provincial 
level, and draw consistent conclusions. Specifically, Table C6 replicates Table 4.1 by 
controlling provincial fixed effect and clustering standard errors at provincial level. The 
results indicate that corruption investigation has no significant effect on individuals’ 
willingness and efforts to work in governments, which are consistent with those in Table 
4.1. 
Table C7 replicates Table 4.2 by controlling provincial fixed effect and clustering 
standard errors at provincial level. Columns (1)-(3) show that corruption investigation 
significantly reduces capable young elites’ willingness to work in governments at 1% level. 
Columns (4)-(6) confirm that corruption investigation significantly pushes capable young 
elites away from seeking government positions at 1% level. Table C7 presents consistent 
results with Table 4.2. In Table C7, the coefficients for interaction term (corruption 
investigation and ability) are all significant at 1% level. However, in Table 4.2, not all 
coefficients for interaction term are significant at 1% level. The results in Table C7 is even 
stronger than those in Table 4.2. 
Furthermore, Figure C5 demonstrates the marginal effect for interaction term at 
95% confidence interval. (a) shows the marginal effects based on estimated results in 
column (3) in Table C7, and confirms that the chance of preferring a political career 
declines as individuals’ ability increases. (b) shows the marginal effects with a smaller 
ability range (3 ≥  ability ≤ 3). It shows that corruption monitoring only increases 
individuals’ preference of government positions when their ability is comparative low 
(ability<-2), the marginal effect declines and becomes insignificant as ability increases. 
Furthermore, (c) shows the marginal effects based on estimated results in column (6) in 
Table C7, and indicates that corruption investigation has a declining effect on individuals’ 
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chance of taking civil service exams. (d) shows the marginal effects with a smaller ability 
range (3 ≥  ability ≤ 3). It shows that corruption monitoring significantly reduces 
individuals’ chance of taking civil service exam when their ability is comparatively high 
(ability> 1). Figure C5 provides further evidences that corruption investigation may push 
capable young elites away from seeking government positions. The results are consistent 
with those in Figure 4.2 and Figure C4. 
Table C8 replicates Table 4.3 by controlling provincial fixed effect and clustering 
standard errors at provincial level. Column (1) and (2) demonstrate that ability is 
significantly and positively linked with expected income at 5% level. In column (3) and 
(4), the results confirm that expected income significantly reduces individuals’ chances of 
taking civil service exam at 1% level. In column (5) and (6), I use a subgroup analysis and 
only include individuals preferring a political careers, the estimated coefficient of ideal 
salary is negative and significant at 1% level. The magnitude of coefficients is more than 
two times larger than those in column (3) and (4). The results implies that individuals 
preferring a political career are more sensitive to the expected income change and less 
likely to take civil exam when expected income decreases. In general, Table C8 presents 
similar and consistent results with those in Table 3. Some estimated models present 
stronger results. For instance, in column (2) of Table C8, the coefficient of ability is 
significant at 5% level, while the coefficient of ability in column (2) in Table 4.3 is 
significant at 10% level. 
Table C9 replicates Table 4.4 by controlling provincial fixed effect and clustering 
standard errors at provincial level. Column (1) shows that corruption investigation of 
government leaders after the anti-corruption campaign significantly reduces elite college 
students’ chances of taking civil service exam at 5% level. After adding more controls in 
column (3), the coefficient remains significant at 10% level. In addition, column (4) 
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indicates that corruption investigation of government leaders after the anti-corruption 
campaign significantly reduces non-elite college students’ chances of taking civil service 
exam at 10% level. However, after adding more controls in column (5) and (6), the 
significance disappears. The distinct results for elite and non-elite college students reveal 
corruption investigation of government leaders is more likely to reduce elite college 
students’ likelihood to take civil service exam, which partly confirms the career prospect 
mechanism. Compared with results in Table 4.4, the significance of key variables 
decreases, yet the results are still consistent. 
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Table C6: Robustness Check: Clustering S.E. at Provincial Level for Table 4.1 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at provincial level are in parentheses. Estimates of constant are 




Table C7: Robustness Check: Clustering S.E. at Provincial Level for Table 4.2 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at provincial level are in parentheses. Estimates of constant are 







Figure C5: Marginal Effect Using Clustering S.E. at Provincial level 
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Table C8: Robustness Check: Clustering S.E. at Provincial Level for Table 4.3 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at provincial level are in parentheses. Estimates of constant are 





Table C9: Robustness Check: Clustering S.E. at Provincial Level for Table 4.4 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at provincial level are in parentheses. Estimates of constant are 




C.1 Mechanism: Economic Return 
 
 
Figure C6: The Proportion of Average Wage in Public Sectors to Total Average Wage  
Notes: The data in this figure is collected from the China Labour Statistical Yearbook. Average wage 
in public sectors refers to the average wage in the sector of public management and social organizations 
in the yearbook. 
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Table C10: Mechanism: Economic Return (Subgroup Analysis of Wage Ratio) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at college level are in parentheses. Estimates of constant are not 








Figure C7: Comparing the Coefficients of Interaction Terms in Table C10 
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C.2 Mechanism: Career Prospect 
Table C11: Mechanism II: Career Mobility Expectation (Investigation of Government 
Officials) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at college level are in parentheses. Estimates of constant are not 
reported. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p< 0.01. 
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Table C12: Mechanism II: Career Mobility Expectation (Subgroup analysis of Private 
Economy) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at college level are in parentheses. Estimates of constant are not 





Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A Robinson. 2001. “The colonial origins of 
comparative development: An empirical investigation.” American Economic Review 
91(5):1369–1401. 
Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin. 2010. “Political selection and 
persistence of bad governments.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 125(4):1511–
1575. 
Acemoglu, Daron, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo and James A Robinson. 2019. 
“Democracy does cause growth.” Journal of Political Economy 127(1):47–100. 
Almén, Oscar. 2013. “Only the Party Manages Cadres: limits of Local People’s Congress 
supervision and reform in China.” Journal of Contemporary China 22(80):237–254. 
Ang, James S, Yingmei Cheng and Chaopeng Wu. 2014. “Does enforcement of intellectual 
property rights matter in China? Evidence from financing and investment choices in 
the high-tech industry.” Review of Economics and Statistics 96(2):332–348. 
Angrist, Joshua D and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. 2008. Mostly harmless econometrics: An 
empiricist’s companion. Princeton: Princeton university press. 
Besley, Timothy and Marta Reynal-Querol. 2011. “Do democracies select more educated 
leaders?” American Political Science Review 105(3):552–566. 
Blaydes, Lisa. 2010. Elections and distributive politics in Mubarak’s Egypt. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bo, Shiyu, Yiping Wu and Lingna Zhong. 2020. “Flattening of government hierarchies and 
misuse of public funds: Evidence from audit programs in China.” Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization 179:141–151. 
Boittin, Margaret, Greg Distelhorst and Francis Fukuyama. 2017. “Reassessing the Quality 
of Government in China.” Working Paper. 
 157 
Burns, John P and Xiaoqi Wang. 2010. “Civil service reform in China: Impacts on civil 
servants’ behaviour.” The China Quarterly 201(March):58–78. 
Büthe, Tim and Helen V Milner. 2008. “The politics of foreign direct investment into 
developing countries: increasing FDI through international trade agreements?” 
American Journal of Political Science 52(4):741–762. 
Cabestan, Jean-Pierre. 2006. “More Power to the People’s Congresses? Parliaments and 
Parliamentarianism in the People’s Republic of China.” ASIEN 99(April):42–69. 
Caselli, Francesco and Massimo Morelli. 2004. “Bad politicians.” Journal of Public 
Economics 88(3-4):759–782. 
Chang, Charles and Melanie Manion. 2021. “Political Self-Censorship in Authoritarian 
States: The Spatial-Temporal Dimension of Trouble.” Comparative Political Studies. 
Chen, Chuanmin. 2020. “Local Economic Development and the Performance of Municipal 
People’s Congress Deputies in China: an Explanation for Regional Variation.” 
Journal of Chinese Political Science 25: 395-410. 
Chen, Jidong, Jennifer Pan and Yiqing Xu. 2016. “Sources of authoritarian responsiveness: 
A field experiment in China.” American Journal of Political Science 60(2):383–400. 
Chen, Ting and James Kai-sing Kung. 2019. “Busting the “Princelings”: The campaign 
against corruption in China’s primary land market.” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 134(1):185– 226. 
Chen, Ting and JK-S Kung. 2016. “Do land revenue windfalls create a political resource 
curse? Evidence from China.” Journal of Development Economics 123:86–106. 
Cho, Young Nam. 2002. “From “rubber stamps” to “iron stamps”: the emergence of 
Chinese local people’s congresses as supervisory powerhouses.” The China Quarterly 
171(September):724–740. 
Cho, Young Nam. 2008. Local People’s Congresses in China: Development and 
Transition. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 158 
Chu, Jian, Raymond Fisman, Songtao Tan and Yongxiang Wang. Forthcoming. 
“Hometown favoritism and the quality of government monitoring: Evidence from 
rotation of Chinese auditors.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. 
Cirone, AE. 2017. “Dual Mandates, Patronage, and Partisanship: Evidence from a 
Regression Discontinuity Design in France.” Working paper. 
Costa, Olivier and Eric Kerrouche. 2009. “MPs under the fifth republic: Professionalisation 
within a weak institution.” West European Politics 32(2):327–344. 
Cox, Gary W. 2008. “The organization of democratic legislatures.” The Oxford handbook 
of political economy. Ed. by Donald A. Wittman and Barry R. Weingast. New York: 
Oxford University Press.  
Dal Bó, Ernesto, Frederico Finan, Olle Folke, Torsten Persson and Johanna Rickne. 2017. 
“Who becomes a politician?” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 132(4):1877–
1914. 
Deng, Xiaoping. 1994. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-1982). Beijing: People’s 
Press. 
Desposato, Scott W. 2006. “Parties for rent? Ambition, ideology, and party switching in 
Brazil’s chamber of deputies.” American Journal of Political Science 50(1):62–80. 
Distelhorst, Greg and Yue Hou. 2017. “Constituency service under nondemocratic rule: 
Evidence from China.” The Journal of Politics 79(3):1024–1040. 
Do, Quoc-Anh, Kieu-Trang Nguyen and Anh N Tran. 2017. “One mandarin benefits the 
whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime.” American Economic 
Journal: Applied Economics 9(4):1–29. 
Edin, Maria. 2003. “State capacity and local agent control in China: CCP cadre 
management from a township perspective.” The China Quarterly 173(March): 35-52. 
 159 
Egorov, Georgy, Sergei Guriev and Konstantin Sonin. 2009. “Why resource-poor dictators 
allow freer media: A theory and evidence from panel data.” American Political 
Science Review 103(4):645– 668. 
Elman, Benjamin A. 2013. Civil examinations and meritocracy in late imperial China. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Ezrow, Natasha M and Erica Frantz. 2011. Dictators and dictatorships: Understanding 
authoritarian regimes and their leaders. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing. 
Feng, Yi, Zhijun Gao and Honglie Helen Zhang. 2018. “What leads to official corruption 
in China? A politico-economic analysis of economic opportunities and government 
corruption across China’s provinces.” Post-Communist Economies 30(3):273–289. 
Ferraz, Claudio and Frederico Finan. 2009. “Motivating politicians: The impacts of 
monetary incentives on quality and performance.” NBER Working Paper 14906. 
Fisman, Raymond, Florian Schulz and Vikrant Vig. 2014. “The private returns to public 
office.” Journal of Political Economy 122(4):806–862. 
Fisman, Raymond, Nikolaj A Harmon, Emir Kamenica and Inger Munk. 2015. “Labor 
supply of politicians.” Journal of the European Economic Association 13(5):871–905. 
Galasso, Vincenzo and Tommaso Nannicini. 2011. “Competing on good politicians.” 
American Political Science Review 105(1):79–99. 
Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. Political institutions under dictatorship. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Gandhi, Jennifer and Adam Przeworski. 2007. “Authoritarian institutions and the survival 
of autocrats.” Comparative political studies 40(11):1279–1301. 
Gandhi, Jennifer, Ben Noble and Milan Svolik. 2020. “Legislatures and Legislative Politics 
without Democracy.” Comparative Political Studies 53(9):1359–1379. 
 160 
Gasper, Donald. 1982. The Chinese National People’s Congress. In Communist 
Legislatures in Comparative Perspective, ed. Daniel Nelson and Stephen White. 
London and Basingstoke: MacMillan Press. 
Geddes, Barbara. 1999. “What do we know about democratization after twenty years?” 
Annual Review of Political Science 2(1):115–144. 
Geddes, Barbara, Joseph George Wright, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz. 2018. How 
dictatorships work: Power, personalization, and collapse. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Gehlbach, Scott, Konstantin Sonin and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2010. “Businessman 
candidates.” American Journal of Political Science 54(3):718–736. 
Gehlbach, Scott and Philip Keefer. 2011. “Investment without democracy: Ruling-party 
institutionalization and credible commitment in autocracies.” Journal of Comparative 
Economics 39(2):123–139. 
Gerring, John, Strom C Thacker and Carola Moreno. 2009. “Are parliamentary systems 
better?” Comparative political studies 42(3):327–359. 
Gervasoni, Carlos. 2010. “A rentier theory of subnational regimes: Fiscal federalism, 
democracy, and authoritarianism in the Argentine provinces.” World Politics 
62(2):302-340. 
Grossman, Guy and W Walker Hanlon. 2014. “Do better monitoring institutions increase 
leadership quality in community organizations? Evidence from Uganda.” American 
Journal of Political Science 58(3):669–686. 
Hainmueller, Jens, Jonathan Mummolo and Yiqing Xu. 2019. “How much should we trust 
estimates from multiplicative interaction models? Simple tools to improve empirical 
practice.” Political Analysis 27(2):163–192. 
Hillman, Ben. 2010. “Factions and spoils: examining political behavior within the local 
state in China.” The China Journal 64:1–18. 
 161 
Hong, Ji Yeon and Wenhui Yang. 2020. “Oilfields, Mosques and Violence: Is There a 
Resource Curse in Xinjiang?” British Journal of Political Science 50(1):45–78. 
Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks and Gary Wolfe Marks. 2001. Multi-level governance and 
European integration. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Hou, Yue. 2019. The Private Sector in Public Office: Selective Property Rights in China. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Høyland, Bjørn, Sara B Hobolt and Simon Hix. 2019. “Career ambitions and legislative 
participation: The moderating effect of electoral institutions.” British Journal of 
Political Science 49(2):491–512. 
Huang, Dongya and Chuanmin Chen. 2015. “Who are More Active to Fulfill the Duties of 
the LPC Deputies:A study based on the 2013-2014 national survey data on county-
level People’s Congress deputies.” Sociological Studies 4:16–193. 
Huang, Xian. 2014. “Expansion of Chinese Social Health Insurance: who gets what, when 
and how?” Journal of Contemporary China 23(89):923–951. 
Huang, Yasheng. 1996. Inflation and investment controls in China: The political economy 
of central-local relations during the reform era. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Jensen, Nathan M, Edmund Malesky and Stephen Weymouth. 2014. “Unbundling the 
Relationship between Authoritarian Legislatures and Political Risk.” British Journal 
of Political Science 44(3):655–684. 
Jia, Ruixue, Masayuki Kudamatsu and David Seim. 2015. “Political selection in China: 
The complementary roles of connections and performance.” Journal of the European 
Economic Association 13(4):631–668. 
Jiang, Junyan. 2018. “Making bureaucracy work: Patronage networks, performance 
incentives, and economic development in china.” American Journal of Political 
Science 62(4):982–999. 
 162 
Jiang, Junyan and Zhaotian Luo. Forthcoming. “Leadership Styles and Political Survival 
of Chinese Communist Party Elites.” Journal of Politics. 
Keane, Michael P and Antonio Merlo. 2010. “Money, political ambition, and the career 
decisions of politicians.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2(3):186–
215. 
Keefer, Philip and David Stasavage. 2003. “The limits of delegation: Veto players, central 
bank independence, and the credibility of monetary policy.” American Political 
Science Review 97(3):407– 423. 
King, Gary, Jennifer Pan and Margaret E Roberts. 2013. “How censorship in China allows 
government criticism but silences collective expression.” American Political Science 
Review 107(2):326– 343. 
Klaˇsnja, Marko, Andrew T Little and Joshua A Tucker. 2018. “Political corruption traps.” 
Political Science Research and Methods 6(3):413–428. 
Ko, Kilkon and Lulu Han. 2013. “An empirical study on public service motivation of the 
next generation civil servants in China.” Public Personnel Management 42(2):191–
222. 
Kou, Chien-wen and Wen-Hsuan Tsai. 2014. ““Sprinting with small steps” towards 
promotion: solutions for the age dilemma in the CCP cadre appointment system.” The 
China Journal 71:153– 171. 
Landry, Pierre. 2008. Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: the Communist Party’s 
control of local elites in the post-Mao era. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Landry, Pierre, Xiaobo Lü and Haiyan Duan. 2018. “Does performance matter? Evaluating 
political selection along the Chinese administrative ladder.” Comparative Political 
Studies 51(8):1074– 1105. 
Laver, Michael J, Michael Laver and Kenneth A Shepsle. 1996. Making and breaking 
governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 163 
Lawless, Jennifer L. 2012. Becoming a candidate: Political ambition and the decision to 
run for office. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Lee, Don S and Paul Schuler. 2020. “Testing the “China Model” of Meritocratic 
Promotions: Do Democracies Reward Less Competent Ministers than Autocracies?” 
Comparative Political Studies 53(3-4):531–566. 
Li, Bobai and Andrew G Walder. 2001. “Career advancement as party patronage: 
sponsored mobility into the Chinese administrative elite, 1949–1996.” American 
Journal of Sociology 106(5):1371– 1408. 
Li, Cheng. 2008. “China’s Fifth Generation: Is Diversity a Source of Strength or 
Weakness?” Asia Policy 6(1):53–93. 
Li, Hongbin and Li-An Zhou. 2005. “Political turnover and economic performance: the 
incentive role of personnel control in China.” Journal of public economics 89(9-
10):1743–1762. 
Li, Hongbin, Lingsheng Meng, Xinzheng Shi and Binzhen Wu. 2012. “Does having a cadre 
parent pay? Evidence from the first job offers of Chinese college graduates.” Journal 
of Development Economics 99(2):513–520. 
Li, Hongbin, Lingsheng Meng, Xinzheng Shi and Binzhen Wu. 2014. “Who are China’s 
future leaders? Evidence from a college student survey.” Working Paper. 
Li, Li, Baoqing Pang and Yiping Wu. 2019. “Isolated counties, administrative monitoring, 
and the misuse of public funds in China.” Governance 32(4):779–797. 
Lieberthal, Kenneth. 2004. Governing China: From revolution through reform. New York 
& London: W.W. Norton & Company. 
Liu, Chuyu and Xiao Ma. 2018. “Popular threats and nationalistic propaganda: Political 
logic of China’s patriotic campaign.” Security Studies 27(4):633–664. 
 164 
Liu, Hanzhang. 2019. “The Logic of Authoritarian Political Selection: Evidence from a 
Conjoint Experiment in China.” Political Science Research and Methods 7(4):853–
870. 
Liu, Hanzhang and Yuhua Wang. 2017. “Elite School Networks and Working for the 
Government: Natural Experimental Evidence from China.” Working Paper . 
Lorentzen, Peter. 2013. “Regularizing rioting: Permitting public protest in an authoritarian 
regime.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 8(2):127–158. 
Lorentzen, Peter L and Xi Lu. 2018. “Personal Ties, Meritocracy, and China’s Anti-
Corruption Campaign.” Working Paper. 
Lü, Xiaobo and Mingxing Liu. 2019. “The Logic of De Facto Power and Local Education 
Spending: Evidence from China.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 49(2):325–
351. 
Lü, Xiaobo, Mingxing Liu and Feiyue Li. 2020. “Policy coalition building in an 
authoritarian legislature: Evidence from China’s national assemblies (1983-2007).” 
Comparative Political Studies 53(9):1380–1416. 
Lü, Xiaobo and Pierre F Landry. 2014. “Show me the money: Interjurisdiction political 
competition and fiscal extraction in China.” American Political Science Review 
108(3): 706–722. 
Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. Voting for autocracy: Hegemonic party survival and its demise 
in Mexico. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Magaloni, Beatriz. 2008. “Credible power-sharing and the longevity of authoritarian rule.” 
Comparative Political Studies 41(4-5):715–741. 
Magaloni, Beatriz and Ruth Kricheli. 2010. “Political order and one-party rule.” Annual 
Review of Political Science 13:123–143. 
 165 
Malesky, Edmund and Paul Schuler. 2010. “Nodding or needling: Analyzing delegate 
responsiveness in an authoritarian parliament.” American Political Science Review 
104(3):482–502. 
Malesky, Edmund and Paul Schuler. 2011. “The Single-Party Dictator’s Dilemma: 
Information in Elections without Opposition.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 
36(4):491–530. 
Manion, Melanie. 1985. “The cadre management system, post-Mao: The appointment, 
promotion, transfer and removal of party and state leaders.” The China Quarterly 
102(June): 203–233. 
Manion, Melanie. 2004. Corruption by design: Building clean government in mainland 
China and Hong Kong. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Manion, Melanie. 2008. “When communist party candidates can lose, who wins? 
Assessing the role of local people’s congresses in the selection of leaders in China.” 
The China Quarterly 195 (September):607– 630. 
Manion, Melanie. 2014. “Authoritarian parochialism: Local congressional representation 
in China.” The China Quarterly 218(June):311–338. 
Manion, Melanie. 2015. Information for autocrats: Representation in Chinese local 
congresses. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Manion, Melanie. 2016. “Taking China’s anticorruption campaign seriously.” Economic 
and Political Studies 4(1):3–18. 
Marks, Gary, Liesbet Hooghe and Kermit Blank. 1996. “European integration from the 
1980s: State-centric v. multi-level governance.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market 
Studies 34(3):341– 378. 
Mattingly, Daniel. 2020. The Art of Political Control in China. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 166 
Mattingly, Daniel C. 2016. “Elite capture: How decentralization and informal institutions 
weaken property rights in China.” World Politics 68(3):383–412. 
Mattozzi, Andrea and Antonio Merlo. 2008. “Political careers or career politicians?” 
Journal of Public Economics 92(3-4):597–608. 
Mauro, Paolo. 1995. “Corruption and growth.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
110(3):681– 712. 
McCormick, Barrett L. 1990. Political reform in post-Mao China: democracy and 
bureaucracy in a Leninist state. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press. 
Meng, Anne. 2021. “Ruling parties in authoritarian regimes: rethinking institutional 
strength.” British Journal of Political Science 51(2):526–540. 
Nathan, Andrew J. 2003. “China’s changing of the guard: Authoritarian resilience.” 
Journal of Democracy 14(1):6–17. 
Naughton, Barry. 2017. “Is China Socialist?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 31(1):3–
24. 
Nelson, Daniel N and Stephen White. 1982. Communist legislatures in comparative 
perspective. London: Macmillan. 
North, Douglass C and Barry R Weingast. 1989. “Constitutions and commitment: the 
evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century England.” 
The Journal of Economic History 49(4):803–832. 
O’Brien, Kevin J. 1988. “China’s National People’s Congress: reform and its limits.” 
Legislative Studies Quarterly 13(3), 343–374. 
O’Brien, Kevin J. 1990a. “Is China’s National People’s Congress a” Conservative” 
Legislature?” Asian Survey 30(8):782–794. 
 167 
O’brien, Kevin J. 1990b. Reform without liberalization: China’s National People’s 
Congress and the politics of institutional change. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
O’brien, Kevin J. 1994. “Chinese people’s congresses and legislative embeddedness: 
understanding early organizational development.” Comparative Political Studies 
27(1):80–107. 
O’Brien, Kevin J. 2006. “Rightful resistance revisited.” Journal of Peasant Studies 
40(6):1051–1062. 
O’Brien, Kevin J. 2009. “Local people’s congresses and governing China.” The China 
Journal 61:131–141. 
Ong, Lynette H. 2015. Reports of social unrest: basic characteristics, trends and patterns, 
2003–12. In Handbook of the Politics of China. ed. David G. Goodman. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 
Pepinsky, Thomas. 2014. “The institutional turn in comparative authoritarianism.” British 
Journal of Political Science 44(3):631–653. 
Pepinsky, Thomas B. 2019. “The return of the single-country study.” Annual Review of 
Political Science 22:187–203. 
Platteau, Jean-Philippe and Frederic Gaspart. 2003. “The risk of resource misappropriation 
in community-driven development.” World Development 31(10):1687–1703. 
Poutvaara, Panu and Tuomas Takalo. 2007. “Candidate quality.” International Tax and 
Public Finance 14(1):7–27. 
Qiu, Yu and Chunquan Song. 2016. “Hierarchy Politics: The Hierarchy Difference of Dual 
Appointment of Party Secretary and Chairman of Congress.” Journal of the Party 
School of CPC Qingdao Municipal Committee 2(In Chinese):72–78. 
Reuter, Ora John and David Szakonyi. 2019. “Elite Defection under Autocracy: Evidence 
from Russia.” American Political Science Review 113(2), 552–568. 
 168 
Reuter, Ora John and Rostislav Turovsky. 2014. “Dominant party rule and legislative 
leadership in authoritarian regimes.” Party Politics 20(5):663–674. 
Schlesinger, Joseph A. 1966. Ambition and politics: Political careers in the United States. 
Chicago: Rand McNally. 
Schuler, Paul. 2020. “Position Taking or Position Ducking? A Theory of Public Debate in 
SingleParty Legislatures.” Comparative Political Studies 53(9):1493–1524. 
Schuler, Paul and Edmund J Malesky. 2014. Authoritarian legislatures. In The Oxford 
handbook of legislative studies. ed. Shane Martin, Thomas Saalfeld and Kaare Strøm. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Shen, Xiaoxiao and Rory Truex. Forthcoming. “In Search of Self-censorship.” British 
Journal of Political Science. 1-13. 
Shih, Victor, Christopher Adolph, Mingxing Li. 2012. “Getting Ahead in the Communist 
Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China.” 
American Political Science Review 106(1):166–187. 
Shirk, Susan L. 2018. “China in Xi’s” New Era”: The Return to Personalistic Rule.” 
Journal of Democracy 29(2):22–36. 
Slater, Dan. 2003. “Iron cage in an iron fist: Authoritarian institutions and the 
personalization of power in Malaysia.” Comparative Politics. 36(1), 81–101. 
Svolik, Milan W. 2012. The politics of authoritarian rule. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Tanner, Murray Scot. 1995. “How a bill becomes a law in China: Stages and processes in 
lawmaking.” The China Quarterly.141 (March): 39–64. 
Treisman, Daniel. 2000. “The causes of corruption: a cross-national study.” Journal of 
Public Economics 76(3):399–457. 
Truex, Rory. 2014. “The returns to office in a” rubber stamp” parliament.” American 
Political Science Review. 108(2), 235–251. 
 169 
Truex, Rory. 2016. Making autocracy work: Representation and responsiveness in modern 
China. New York : Cambridge University Press. 
Truex, Rory. 2020. “Authoritarian Gridlock? Understanding Delay in the Chinese 
Legislative System.” Comparative Political Studies 53(9):1455–1492. 
Wallace, Jeremy. 2014. Cities and stability: Urbanization, redistribution, and regime 
survival in China. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Wang, Yuhua. 2014. “Empowering the police: how the Chinese Communist Party manages 
its coercive leaders.” The China Quarterly. 219(September): 625–648. 
Wang, Yuhua and Carl Minzner. 2015. “The rise of the Chinese security state.” The China 
Quarterly. 222 (June): 339–359. 
Wang, Zhi, Qinghua Zhang and Li’an Zhou. 2020. “Career Incentives of City Leaders and 
Urban Spatial Expansion in China.” Review of Economics and Statistics 102(5):897–
911. 
Wang, Zhongyuan. 2017. “Playing by the Rules: How Local Authorities Engineer Victory 
in Direct Congressional Elections in China.” Journal of Contemporary China 
26(108):870–885. 
Weber, Max. 1978. Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Wedeman, Andrew. 2012. Double paradox: Rapid growth and rising corruption in China. 
New York: Cornell University Press. 
Wei, Shang-Jin. 1999. “Corruption in Economic Development: Beneficial Grease, Minor 
Annoyance, or Major Obstacle?” Working Paper. 
Weiner, Myron. 1987. Competitive elections in developing dountries. Durham: Duke 
University Press. 
Wilson, Matthew Charles and Joseph Wright. 2017. “Autocratic legislatures and 
expropriation risk.” British Journal of Political Science 47(1):1–17. 
 170 
Wintrobe, Ronald. 2000. The political economy of dictatorship. Cambridge and New 
York : Cambridge University Press. 
Wright, Joseph. 2008. “Do authoritarian institutions constrain? How legislatures affect 
economic growth and investment.” American Journal of Political Science 52(2):322–
343. 
Wright, Joseph and Abel Escribà-Folch. 2012. “Authoritarian institutions and regime 
survival: Transitions to democracy and subsequent autocracy.” British Journal of 
Political Science pp. 42(2), 283– 309. 
Xi, Tianyang, Yang Yao and Muyang Zhang. 2018. “Capability and opportunism: 
Evidence from city officials in China.” Journal of Comparative Economics 
46(4):1046–1061. 
Xia, Ming. 2007. The People’s Congresses and governance in China: toward a network 
mode of governance. London and New York: Routledge. 
Xu, Chenggang. 2011. “The fundamental institutions of China’s reforms and 
development.” Journal of Economic Literature 49(4):1076–1151. 
Xu, Gang and Go Yano. 2017. “How does anti-corruption affect corporate innovation? 
Evidence from recent anti-corruption efforts in China.” Journal of Comparative 
Economics 45(3):498–519. 
Yang, Wenhui and Ling Chen. 2016. “Political capital and intergenerational mobility: 
Evidence from elite college admissions in China.” Chinese Journal of Sociology 
2(2):194–213. 
Yao, Yang and Muyang Zhang. 2015. “Subnational leaders and economic growth: 
evidence from Chinese cities.” Journal of Economic Growth 20(4):405–436. 
Yu, Jihai, Li-An Zhou and Guozhong Zhu. 2016. “Strategic interaction in political 
competition: Evidence from spatial effects across Chinese cities.” Regional Science 
and Urban Economics 57:23– 37. 
 171 
Yuen, Samson. 2014. “Disciplining the party. xi jinping’s anti-corruption campaign and its 
limits.” China Perspectives 2014(2014/3):41–47. 
Zhu, Jiangnan and Dong Zhang. 2017. “Weapons of the powerful: Authoritarian elite 
competition and politicized anticorruption in China.” Comparative Political Studies 
50(9):1186–1220. 
 
 
 
 
